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GOVERNMENT: PRACTICAL
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TRADING BASED ON POLITICAL
INTELLIGENCEt
Donna M. Nagy*
Richard W. Painter**
From its founding, the federal government of the United States
has been a potential gold mine for nonpublic market-moving infor-
mation. By selectively disclosing this information to securities traders
outside the government (or to persons who advise them), federal offi-
cials can substantially privilege certain wealthy or otherwise well-
connected investors over ordinary investors in the securities market.
The trading profits that can be derived from the use of this material
nonpublic government information are often tremendous.
This disparity of access to government information may be un-
fair. But absent an identifiable personal benefit on the part of the
government insider, neither the selective disclosure of government in-
formation nor the securities trading by persons on the outside consti-
tutes a violation of the federal securities laws-even under the newly
enacted Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act.
Moreover, this "political intelligence" problem appears to be worsen-
ing: in recent months, news reports about federal officials' selective
disclosure of nonpublic government information have proliferated,
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and the SEC and DOJ are currently investigating how these leaks
may have occurred.
To address the problem of selective disclosure, this Article pro-
poses practical solutions that focus on the source of the political intel-
ligence problem: the federal government itself. Solving-or at least
reducing the amount of-selective disclosure is a complex endeavor.
Equal treatment of investors is an admirable goal, but in many situa-
tions, the government has legitimate interests in communicating with
members of the public and disclosing information only to certain par-
ties. Thus, this Article attempts to carve out a middle ground that nei-
ther unduly inhibits governmental functions nor allows for patently
unequal treatment of investors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two years ago, news broke that the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") had launched an investigation regarding a pri-
vate meeting in July 2008 between then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson and about a dozen hedge fund and private equity firm manag-
ers.1 According to the Wall Street Journal:
SEC investigators are seeking information on whether Mr. Paulson
suggested in the meeting that the government was willing to rescue
the struggling mortgage-finance companies Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac .... The SEC is also looking at whether the firms traded
on any information Mr. Paulson had shared .... 2
The article reported that the SEC had sent subpoenas to the firms de-
manding information about specific trades made shortly after the meet-
ing.3
This SEC investigation has so far not amounted to anything, and
probably never will. No enforcement action is likely to be taken against
anyone, even if Secretary Paulson did share material nonpublic infor-
mation about the government's plans with the hedge fund and private
equity firm managers (it is not clear what information he shared and
1. See Juliet Chung & Jean Eaglesham, Trades After 2008 Meeting Probed, WALL ST. J., Sept.
13, 2012, at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100087239630444433504577650082716565686.
2. Id. Bloomberg News broke the initial story about the meeting itself. See Richard
Teitelbaum, How Paulson Gave Hedge Funds Advance Word of Fannie Mae Rescue, BLOOMBERG
PERS. FIN. (Nov. 29, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-29/how-henry-
paulson-gave-hedge-funds-advance-word-of-2008-fannie-mae-rescue.html (reporting that at least five
of the meeting's attendees were alumni of Goldman Sachs and that one hedge fund manager "was
shocked that Paulson would furnish such specific information to his mind, leaving little doubt that
the Treasury Department would carry out the plan" to effectively wipe out the common and preferred
stock of Fannie and Freddie).
3. Chung & Eaglesham, supra note I (stating that Taconic Capital Advisors confirmed that it
had "received a subpoena related to the meeting" and reporting that the other meeting attendees in-
cluded representatives of GSO Capital Partners, now part of Blackstone Group LP, Lone Pine Capital
LLC, Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC, and TPG-Axon Management LP).
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whether it was nonpublic), and even if the firms did trade Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac-related securities on the basis of that information. To
be sure, information leaks of this sort can generate tremendous trading
profits for securities investors who learn of market-moving information
either directly or indirectly (through the use of so-called political intelli-
gence consultants, who capitalize on their connections to the inside of
government).4 Securities trading based on such privileged access to ma-
terial nonpublic government information undermines the public's confi-
dence in the fairness and integrity of securities markets-and in the fed-
eral government itself. But the selective disclosure of market-moving
government information, and securities trading on the basis of that in-
formation, is generally not illegal under federal securities law.
The stumbling block for the SEC's investigation of the Paulson
meeting is that liability for illegal tipping generally turns on whether
there has been a violation of Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 thereunder, which broadly prohibit fraud "in connection with
the purchase or sale" of a security. And according to the Supreme
Court's 1983 ruling in Dirks v. SEC,6 the disclosure of material nonpublic
information constitutes securities fraud only when a person breaches a
fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence by benefitting personally, di-
rectly or indirectly, from the disclosure.7 In the Court's view, the requi-
site inquiry in a tipping case is a contextual one that focuses on "objec-
tive criteria," such as "pecuniary gain" on the part of the tipper, "a
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings," or "a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend."8 Accordingly, it
is not the mere breach of a duty of confidentiality or care that renders
the communication of market-moving government information a fraudu-
lent tip-it is a government insider's undisclosed self-serving use of that
4. See Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam, Buying 'Political Intelligence' Can Pay off Big for Wall
Street, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732466040
4578202072713156116 (reporting that "[t]he political-intelligence business has expanded rapidly over a
decade as government decisions have come to play a growing role for some on Wall Street" and that
"[i]nvestors spend more than $400 million a year for such intelligence"); see also Eamon Javers, Wash-
ington Whispers to Wall Street, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 25, 2005), http://www.business
week.com/stories/2005-12-25/washington-whispers-to-wall-street; Jim Snyder, K Street Phones Wall
Street, THE HILL (Feb. 15, 2005), https://archive.is/Ojjel. For an insightful student note, see Bud W.
Jerke, Comment, Cashing in on Capitol Hill: Insider Trading and the Use of Political Intelligence for
Profit, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1451 (2010).
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (authorizing the SEC to promulgate rules prohibiting "manipu-
lative or deceptive device [s] or contrivance [s]" in connection "with the purchase or sale of any securi-
ty"); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2013) ("It shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.").
6. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
7. Id. at 661-62.
8. Id. at 663 64; see also id. ("The theory ... is that the insider, by giving the information out
selectively, is in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other
things of value for himself .. ") (quoting Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Ad-
vantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 348 (1979)).
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information in breach of his or her duty of loyalty.9 The recently enacted
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge ("STOCK") Act amends the
federal securities laws to specify that all federal officials (including mem-
bers of Congress) owe "a duty arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence to the United States Government and the citizens of the
United States" and eliminates any doubt that personally benefiting from
the use of nonpublic government information violates this duty.0 But the
STOCK Act does nothing to alter Dirks' holding that a personal benefit
on the part of the tipper is essential for the disclosure of information to
constitute securities fraud.11
The Supreme Court has also made clear that so-called tippee liabil-
ity "is derivative from that of the insider's duty."12 That is, a recipient of
material nonpublic information assumes a fiduciary-like duty not to trade
on that information only when the person disclosing it has breached a du-
ty of trust and confidence "and the tippee knows or should know that
there has been a breach."13 Thus, absent the receipt of a personal benefit
evidencing a federal official's disloyalty to the government,14 privileged
investors who receive selectively disclosed information are generally free
to trade securities based on that information. Although it is not clear
why Secretary Paulson had the meeting with the hedge fund and private
equity firm managers or believed it important to reveal the information
9. The Court's decision in Dirks was rendered in a "classical" insider trading case involving a
former officer of the corporation that issued the securities that were traded. By virtue of his relation-
ship with the securities issuer, the former officer owed a duty of trust and confidence to the sharehold-
ers with whom the recipients of his disclosures were trading. Fourteen years later, the Court recog-
nized an alternative "misappropriation" theory of insider trading, which extends securities fraud
liability to "outsider" cases where material nonpublic information is used in breach of a duty of trust
and confidence owed to the source of the information. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652
(1997) ("In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and pur-
chaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-
turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information."). Gov-
ernment insider trading and tipping cases fall squarely within the misappropriation theory because
while federal officials are "insiders" of the U.S. government, they are "outsiders" to the corporation
that issued the securities that were traded. Although O'Hagan did not address directly the question of
liability for tipping, it is now well settled that the personal benefit test developed in Dirks also "gov-
erns in a misappropriation case." SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2012).
10. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 9(b), 126 Star. 291, 298 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-1(g) (h)).
11. Id. Personal gain on the part of the federal official would likewise be necessary in order to
prosecute tipping as a violation of federal anti-corruption statutes, including those prohibiting honest
services fraud and the receipt of bribes or illegal gratuities. See generally Peter J. Henning & Lee J.
Radek, Prosecution and Defense of Public Corruption: THE LAW AND LEGAL STRATEGIES 37 47, 107
121 (2011).
12. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659; see also id. at 662 ("Absent some personal gain, there has been no
breach of duty .... And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.").
13. Id. at 660; see also id. at 659 (explaining that the "tippee's obligation has been viewed as aris-
ing from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty") (quoting
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 891, 898 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming conviction
of FBI agent and his tippee where agent was promised a share of the trading profits generated from
the use of misappropriated confidential law enforcement information); see also Haas v. Henkel, 216
U.S. 462, 478 (1910) (affirming decision sustaining indictment charging defendants with a conspiracy to
obtain crop reports from a Department of Agriculture statistician "in advance of general publicity and
to use such information in speculating upon the cotton market").
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about Fannie and Freddie, it is difficult to imagine that his motivation
could satisfy the high hurdle of the personal benefit test established by
Dirks. Indeed, we have no doubt that the vast majority of government
officials who selectively share nonpublic information with persons on the
outside do so for legitimate reasons consistent with their duty of loyalty
to the federal government and its citizens. Information exchange is a
two-way street and feedback or input from knowledgeable persons in the
private sector can oftentimes be crucial to government decision-making.
Hedge funds or other privileged investors who receive selectively
disclosed government information likewise cannot typically be charged
with securities fraud under the misappropriation theory of insider trad-
ing. Liability under the misappropriation theory requires evidence that
the person who traded on or tipped material nonpublic information
stands in a fiduciary-like relationship of trust and confidence with its
source. 15 When selectively disclosed government information is at issue,
such evidence is rare, absent a principal/agent or some other special rela-
tionship between the securities trader and the government 16 Although an
SEC rule imposes a duty of "trust or confidence" in situations where "a
person agrees to maintain information in confidence"17 or where persons
have a "history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences,"18 for liability
under the misappropriation theory to attach, there must also be a rea-
sonable expectation on the part of the source that the entrusted infor-
mation would not be used for securities trading purposes.19 Returning
again to the Paulson incident, it does not appear that anyone at the meet-
ing had been instructed not to trade,0 nor is it likely that the Secretary
had a "history, pattern or practice" of sharing government secrets with
the hedge fund and private equity firm managers who attended the meet-
ing.
In a prior law review article, we gathered together press reports,
administrative agency and congressional correspondence, and other ma-
terials revealing a litany of private meetings with legislative and execu-
tive branch officials that likely generated enormous trading profits for
15. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
16. Government contractors, for example, typically sign agreements that prohibit the contractor
and its affiliates from "[u]sing or releasing nonpublic information received under the contract except
under limited conditions." Keith R. Szeliga, Conflict and Intrigue in Government Contracts: A Guide
to Identifying and Mitigating Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 639, 647 (2006).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2013). But see SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 728 (N.D.
Tex. 2009) (holding that the defendant's alleged trading on information subject to a confidentiality
agreement would not have been deceptive under Section 10(b) unless the SEC could also show that
defendant "agreed, expressly or implicitly, to refrain from trading on or otherwise using for his own
benefit the information the CEO was about to share"), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 620
F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2).
19. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 643, 652 (framing the misappropriation theory as "a fiduciary's
undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities" and stating that
"the deception essential to the theory involves feigning fidelity to the information's source").
20. See Teitelbaum, supra note 2 (positing that those attending the meeting were "given a choice
opportunity to trade on that information").
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the privileged attendees or their clients.21 Some of the selective disclo-
sures apparently made at these meetings concerned regulators' stances
toward industries or individual companies, such as communications be-
tween hedge fund executives and the Department of Education about
regulation of for-profit colleges22 or between institutional investors and
the Department of Defense about cost-cutting plans.23 Many other dis-
closures were made in the course of private briefings arranged by politi-
cal intelligence consultants, who brought hedge fund and private equity
firm managers together with members of Congress or their legislative
aides.24 These managers constitute "a select group who pay[s] for early,
firsthand reports on Capitol Hill," which is becoming "a growing, lucra-
tive -and legal -practice .... ",25 But the federal government's problem
with selective disclosure dates back more than two hundred years: in
1789, speculators learned from sources in the Treasury Department and
Congress about then-Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's success-
ful push for a federal bailout of the states from their Revolutionary War
debt.26 From at least that time forward to the present, federal govern-
ment insiders have adhered to a long tradition of leaking material non-
public information to well-connected outsiders who then used that in-
formation in connection with securities trading or advising. 27
21. Donna M. Nagy & Richard W. Painter, Selective Disclosure by Federal Officials and the Case
for an FGD (Fairer Government Disclosure) Regime, 2012 Wis. L. REV. 1285, 1301 08.
22. Ben Protess, Grassley Questions Education Agency's Ties to Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/28/grassley-questions-education-agencys-ties-to-wall-
street/.
23. Joe Nocera, From Pentagon, a Buy Rating on Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/business/12nocera.html?pagewanted=all (sharply critiquing what was
claimed to be the growing practice of officials at the Pentagon "sidling up to" institutional investors
and securities analysts specializing in the military industry).
24. Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam, Inside Capitol, Investor Access Yields Rich Tips, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 20, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000142405297020484450457710260349084
878.
25. Id.
26. See Nagy & Painter, supra note 21, at 1297 (discussing this incident as recounted in the jour-
nal of William Maclay, a Senator representing Pennsylvania in the First Congress).
27. We use the broad term "leak" to describe the intentional sharing of material nonpublic in-
formation with a favored person or group of persons. Many legal scholars, however, have focused
specifically on leaks to the press, with most of those leaks involving classified or confidential national
security information. See, e.g., GARY Ross, WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN? THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (2011); GEOFFREY R. STONE, TOP
SECRET: WHEN OUR GOVERNMENT KEEPS US IN THE DARK (2007); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs,
Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233 (2008);
David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Dis-
closures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013). Professor Pozen further distinguishes between
unauthorized leaks and "plants," which involve explicitly authorized disclosures designed to advance
governmental interests. Id. at 534. What lies between leaks and plants he categorizes as "pleaks," a
term that encompasses quasi-authorized disclosures through which "senior [government] officials pur-
sue rival policy goals." Id. at 568. He thus points out that while "[t]he heads of executive branch
agencies and their immediate advisers and assistant secretaries are widely thought to be inveterate
leakers[,]" they can "be better understood as a community of pleakers." Id. at 569. We find Professor
Pozen's deconstruction of national security leaks enormously helpful, and we would venture to say
that our examples of selectively disclosed market-moving information may well involve more "pleak-
ing" than leaking (with some planting as well).
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Our earlier article had several objectives beyond demonstrating the
ubiquity of selective disclosure in the federal government. As encapsu-
lated in the above discussion of the Paulson incident, we also analyzed
insider trading law to show why most instances of selective disclosure by
federal officials fail to constitute illegal tipping, and we analogized this
troubling problem to a past practice in the private sector. In the 1980s
and 1990s, corporate executives at publicly traded companies routinely
provided securities analysts and professional investors with material
nonpublic information pertaining to corporate earnings and other mar-
ket-moving developments.
Regulation Fair Disclosure ("FD")," which the SEC adopted in
2000, put an end to that unfair informational advantage by instituting an
"all or nothing" rule: publicly traded companies are not required to make
any additional disclosures, "but if they tell someone, they must tell eve-
ryone."2 9 Regulation FD, however, leveled the playing field for all inves-
tors only after SEC officials looked beyond the construct of fraudulent
tipping and trading. The SEC's pre-FD struggle with selective disclosure
in the private sector informed our critique of legislative proposals seek-
ing to curtail securities trading on the basis of nonpublic government in-
formation. One of these proposals would have prohibited such trading
outright,30 and the other (still under consideration in Congress) would
require political intelligence consultants to register under the Lobbying
Disclosure Act before seeking to acquire information from federal offi-
cials." We concluded that each proposal placed unjustifiable burdens on
the private sector and that neither tackled the problem of selective dis-
closure at its root, which is the federal government's own lack of effective
internal controls regarding its dissemination of so-called political intelli-
32gence.
The final part of our prior article urged the adoption of a new re-
gime for Fairer Government Disclosure ("FGD"). We acknowledged
that there was additional study and work to be done as to how an FGD
regime could best be implemented and enforced. But we proposed a se-
28. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2013).
29. Robert B. Thompson & Ronald King, Credibility and Information in Securities Markets After
Regulation FD, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 615, 615 (2001).
30. See H.R. 1148, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Nagy & Painter, supra note 21, at 1334 (observing
that H.R. 1148 "garnered a remarkable 285 cosponsors in the House in the aftermath of a 60 Minutes
segment" shedding light on securities trading based on nonpublic government information).
31. Nagy & Painter, supra note 21, at 133(-34 (discussing legislative efforts "to require registra-
tion of 'political intelligence firm[s]' and public reporting of 'political intelligence activities').
32. As an alternative to regulating the gathering of political intelligence, the STOCK Act in-
structed the Comptroller General, in consultation with the Congressional Research Service, to study
and report to Congress within a year on the "role of political intelligence in the financial markets."
That study, perhaps not surprisingly, left its central question unanswered. See U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-389, POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE: FINANCIAL MARKET VALUE OF
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION HINGES ON MATERIALITY AND TIMING (2013), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/660/653532.pdf [hereinafter GAO POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY] (concluding that "[t]he
prevalence of the sale of political intelligence is not known and therefore difficult to quantify" and that
the "extent to which investment decisions are based on a single piece of political intelligence would be
extremely difficult to measure").
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ries of interim measures that could be taken by federal officials, either
individually or through directives from agency heads or congressional
committees. Among other steps, we suggested that federal officials make
greater use of confidentiality agreements with nonuse components. We
also recommended greater use of the internet and encouraged more
postings by agencies and congressional offices, more webcasts, and over-
all more transparency. Our bottom line was that any new regime for the
federal government, like Regulation FD for publicly traded companies,
should focus on regulating "insiders and what they do... rather than on
policing information per se and its possession .... "'
In the months since the publication of our prior article, news reports
about other incidents of selective disclosure by federal officials have pro-
liferated. At the start of 2013, the Wall Street Journal was the first to re-
port that the SEC had issued subpoenas to the Marwood Group, a politi-
cal intelligence firm founded by Edward Kennedy Jr., that sought infor-
information as to how the firm "was able to warn its Wall Street clients
that regulators [from the Food and Drug Administration] might delay
approving a promising drug in the fall of 2010. '34 Several months later,
front-page newspaper headlines revealed inquiries by the SEC and the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") into the leak of a federal funding deci-
sion pertaining to health care reimbursements -a leak which apparently
sparked a trading surge in the stock of Humana, Aetna, and other major
health companies. 35 Initial speculation focused on particular Senate
staffers whose emails and telephone records reflected conversations with
political intelligence consultants who had been retained by brokerage
firms. 36  But several weeks later, the Washington Post reported that at
least 436 employees at the Department of Health and Human Services
"had early access to the Medicare decision as much as two weeks before
it was made public. '37  Around that same time, an altogether different
33. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983) (quoting Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 648
(1971)). We were hardly the first commentators to point out the disparities between the treatment of
selective disclosure in the private and public sectors. Professor Larry Ribstein did so years before us.
See Larry Ribstein, Congressmen as Securities Traders, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Mar. 13, 2011),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/03/13/congressmen-as-securities-traders/ ("[Congress can protect]
against corruption by mandating disclosure not only of trades but also tips. In other words, as little as I
like Regulation FD, there might be some benefit to imposing something like it on Congress.").
34. Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 4.
35. Jerry Markon & Jia Lynn Yang, Intel for Investors: What's Going on Behind Closed Doors in
Washington, WASH. POST, May 2, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/political-intelligence-
industry-in-washington-under-scrutiny-amid-federal-inquiry/2013/05/02/e284e08e-b364-11e2-9a98-4be
1688d7d84 story.html; Jia Lynn Yang et al., How 'Political Intelligence' Can Come from Congress It-
self, WASH. POST, May 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/how-political-intelli
gence-can-come- from-congress-itself/2013/05/06/a2998e4c-b68a- 11e2-b94c-b684dda07add story.html;
see also Brody Mullins & Tom McGinty, SEC Broadens Its Probe of "Political Intelligence", WALL ST.
J., May 4, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000014241278873245820048784614922673834
64.
36. See Yang et al., supra note 35.
37. Tom Hamburger & Dina ElBoghdady, Hundreds in Government Had Advance Word of
Medicare Action at Heart of Trading Spike Prove, WASH. POST, June 9, 2013, http://www.washington
post.com/politics/hundreds-in-government-had-advance-word-of-medicare-action-at-heart-of-trading-
spike-probe/2013/06/09/044944d0-cec7-1le2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html.
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spotlight was directed at political intelligence briefings apparently occur-
ring at the White House.38 At the center of that controversy were private
conversations between Wall Street investors and "Obama administration
officials, including a top White House adviser helping to implement the
Affordable Care Act.,
39
This Article builds on our prior work by proposing practical solu-
tions to the problem (both real and perceived) of securities trading based
on political intelligence. In stark contrast to the reporting-and-
registration remedy that places the burden on private sector persons who
gather and use political intelligence, we direct our attention to the source
of the problem: the federal government itself. While we begin with the
premise that federal officials should disseminate market-moving gov-
ernment information to the general public as soon as possible, we also
recognize that government information often must remain nonpublic for
a period of time. We thus suggest a variety of ways to plug up the leaks,
which would prevent material nonpublic government information from
falling into the hands of persons who are likely to use it for trading in se-
curities markets. We also emphasize that the process for lowering levees
can be crucial because some procedures for the public dissemination of
market-moving information provide broader and more equal access than
others. In all of these situations, however, equal treatment of investors
has to be weighed against other government objectives, including effec-
tive interaction by federal agencies and by Congress with regulated in-
dustry, public interest groups, and other constituencies outside the gov-
ernment.
Our analysis is centered on fairer disclosure by the federal govern-
ment. We do not make specific proposals for states and localities be-
cause these governments differ widely in organizational structure and
function. But we do discuss unique problems likely to arise in the state
and local setting, including the fact that many officials work for the gov-
ernment part time and interact with private clients, investors, and other
commercial interests in their nongovernment employment. We also
briefly explore what may be a frequent temptation on the part of public
universities to fund academic research through the selective disclosure of
market-moving information to third-parties who, in turn, sell that infor-
38. See Tom Hamburger, Political Intelligence Firms Set up Investor Meetings at the White House,
WASH. POST, May 26, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/political-intelligence-firms-set-up-
investor-meetings-at-white-house/2013/05/26/73b06528-bccb-1le2-9b09-1638acc3942e-story.html; Tom
Hamburger, Investor Access, at the Top Level, WASH. POST, May 27, 2013, http://www.washington
post.com/politics-intelligence-firms-set-up-investor-meetings-9boq-163acc392c-story.html.
39. Id. (reporting that these conversations and a separate fifty minute conference call involving
an official at the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services and managers of hedge funds, pension
plans, and mutual funds, were arranged by political intelligence firms). The journalist emphasized,
however, that "[t]here is no evidence that the private discussions with the two administration officials
about health-care decisions provided investors with confidential agency information or that the inves-
tors made trades based on what they learned." Id.
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mation to securities traders.40 Moreover, with the growth of global secu-
rities markets, selective disclosure of information by governments is a
global problem.41 While solutions to this problem will differ from coun-
try to country, and while many countries may not even attempt to solve
the problem, countries that care about selective disclosure of government
information will need to coordinate their efforts for some of their con-
trols to be effective.
Part II discusses existing statutes and regulations, as well as a sam-
pling of specific agency policies, relating to the disclosure of government
information. Although some of these provisions and practices are de-
signed to insure the public's access to government information (subject
to certain exceptions), lucrative profits can often be made from securities
trading on the basis of that information. Information, for example, could
be released under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") to persons
who specifically requested it, yet that information would not be "public"
under a definition of the term that turns on whether it has been "effec-
tively disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its availability to the in-
vesting public."'42 Part II also discusses the much larger body of statutes,
regulations, and agency policies that are designed to protect confidential
information from unauthorized disclosure by government officials. Some
of these measures are aimed at potential use of the information in securi-
ties markets, but most are directed at other abuses, such as threats to na-
tional security or law enforcement, invasions of privacy, or unauthorized
disclosures of information entrusted to a government agency. Notwith-
standing provisions of this sort, selective disclosures often occur because
much nonpublic information may not be designated as "confidential,"
and even when confidential information is at issue, agency heads and
senior officials have enormous discretion over the circumstances under
which authorized disclosure can be made.43 Moreover, most of these
provisions do not extend to congressional officials and employees, and
confidentiality obligations applicable to Congress are ill-defined outside
of specific contexts such as national security.
Part III discusses countervailing considerations that must be given
substantial weight in the crafting of any new statutes, regulations, and
policies designed to achieve fairer government disclosure. These include
possible constitutional constraints on provisions that treat certain catego-
40. See infra notes 212 16 and accompanying text (discussing Thomson-Reuters's annual pay-
ments to the University of Michigan for the exclusive right to disseminate and publish consumer-
confidence research data).
41. See Jayanth Varma, Selective Price Sensitive Disclosure by Government Functionaries, PROF.
JAYANTH R. VARMA'S FIN. MKTS. BLOG (Oct. 26, 2012, 7:03 PM), http://jrvarma.wordpress.com/2012/
10/26/selective-price-sensitive-disclosure-by-government-functionaries/ (hyperlinking memorandum
from the Chairman of the UK Statistics Authority to UK Prime Minister David Cameron questioning
an incident of prerelease access to official statistics). The author observed that "[i]n India also we
have seen selective (and even misleading) disclosure of information by government functionaries" and
that "[t]here is a need to develop mechanisms to reduce the chance of such events." Id.
42. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
43. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294 (1979).
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ries of outsiders, such as hedge fund and private equity firms, differently
with respect to their access to government information. There are also
constitutional and policy considerations to take into account with leak-
plugging approaches that impede the rights of citizens to engage in con-
versations with federal officials about policy concerns and grievances
against the government. Another countervailing concern is whether cur-
tailment of selective disclosure could interfere with scrutiny of govern-
ment by outside persons and organizations who gather information,
whether through FOIA requests or otherwise. An additional considera-
tion is whether a policy against selective disclosure might interfere with
the ability of federal officials to learn valuable information and receive
useful policy input and analysis from their interaction with important
constituencies.
Part IV constructs several alternative approaches to fairer govern-
ment disclosure and considers how these alternatives can be implement-
ed and enforced. We recognize, however, that the problem of selective
disclosure is as complex as it is serious. If Congress and the executive
branch go overboard in their control of information leaks, they could
sacrifice important elements of effective and open government and could
unconstitutionally infringe on the rights of citizens. On the other hand, if
Congress and the executive branch ignore the selective disclosure prob-
lem, their passivity allows federal officials to favor and enrich some in-
vestors at the expense of others. As with many other complex public pol-
icy problems, doing too much is not a good choice, but failing to act is
just as bad. There is a middle path, and this Article begins a conversa-
tion about how to blaze it.
II. EXISTING LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES RELATING TO THE
DISCLOSURE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
A. Provisions and Practices Designed to Facilitate Public Access to
Government Information
1. The Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act' is premised upon a transparency
principle and requires government agencies to disclose certain infor-
mation upon request.4 5  FOIA, however, is a request-based regime,
46
meaning that unless otherwise required to be made public, the infor-
mation is only disclosed upon request to the particular person who re-
44. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
45. Id.
46. FOIA's general public reporting requirements are set forth in 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1) and (2).
These provisions require each agency to publish certain statements and rules in the Federal Register,
and mandate public availability for the inspection and copying of a host of other materials including
final opinions and orders, interpretative statements, and staff manuals/instructions that affect members
of the public.
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quests it.47 If the requestor is a news organization, some, but probably
not all, of the information is likely to be publicly disclosed in a news sto-
ry, assuming there is one. If the requestor is a private person or entity,
however, the information may not become public for a long time, if ever.
FOIA does not mandate public disclosure-on an agency website, press
release or otherwise-of information that has been disclosed in response
to a FOIA request.48
FOIA, and agency policies for answering FOIA requests, thus do
not necessarily mean that market-moving information subject to valid
FOIA requests is disclosed to investors generally or incorporated into se-
curities prices. Information could be made available to a requestor yet
not "effectively disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its availability
to the investing public. '49  Requestors under FOIA are not prohibited
from using the information for trading in securities markets, and are not
prohibited from passing the information along to persons who will do the
same. Nor should they be. While FOIA requestors may possess an in-
formational advantage in securities markets, that advantage is not "uner-
odable" -any person with the wherewithal to make a request can obtain
that same advantage.50
Furthermore, certain information is exempt from disclosure under
FOIA-and in fact should not be disclosed-in response to a request.
Several categories of information are exempt, including trade secret in-
formation that a third party has entrusted to a federal agency, infor-
mation about supervision and examination of financial institutions, law
enforcement information, and agency personnel information.51  FOIA
recognizes that in these areas, either the government itself or a third par-
ty has an interest in keeping information confidential.
2. Other Federal Statutes Aimed at Transparency and Accountability
In addition to FOIA, a host of other federal statutes have govern-
mental transparency and accountability as key objectives. For example,
federal agencies are required to disclose some information about their
internal rulemaking process, including comment letters they receive, pur-
suant to the Administrative Procedure Act.52  Some agency meetings
must be open to the public pursuant to the Government in the Sunshine
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3).
48. Agencies are, however, required to make available for public inspection and copying all rec-
ords that have been released to requestors if the agency determines that, because of the nature of their
subject matter, the records "have become or are likely to become the subject of subsequent requests
for substantially the same records." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D).
49. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
50. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 59 (1997) (citing Professor Victor Brudney
and emphasizing that while "informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets," investors
lose confidence in markets and "hesitate to venture their capital" when an informational "disad-
vantage ... cannot be overcome with research or skill").
51. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
52. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, §10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 243-44 (1946) (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. §706).
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Act.53 And many federal agencies are required to provide periodic re-
ports to Congress, most of which are made available to the public, alt-
hough there may be a delay. 4
There is, however, no general transparency regime mandating pub-
lic disclosure for departments and agencies in the federal government.
Yet Congress imposes onerous financial transparency and certain other
disclosure requirements on thousands of private sector companies.5 Pur-
suant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, more than 14,000 "publicly
traded" companies file with the SEC annual (10-K) and quarterly (10-0)
reports as well as special reports about particular categories of significant
developments during intervals between periodic reports (8-K).56 All of
these reports are easily accessible to the public on the SEC's website 7
The absence of an analogous reporting regime for the federal govern-
ment means that a lot of government information is not disclosed public-
ly even if it is publicly available in the sense that members of the public
have the ability to obtain access to it. Well informed securities markets
are not the object of these open government laws, and only sometimes
do these laws lead federal agencies to provide investors in general with
the publicly available information that investors would consider material.
3. Recent Open-Government Initiatives in the Executive Branch
On his first day in office, President Obama ordered the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") to issue an open government di-
rective requiring federal agencies to take specific steps toward greater
transparency, participation, and collaboration. 8 But neither that OMB
directive, nor any of the open-government initiatives that followed in its
aftermath, were tailored specifically toward preventing the type of in-
53. 5 U.S.C. § 552b.
54. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285,
accounts for much of this reporting. Indeed, there are so many such reports that Congress phased
some of them out in the Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, but many of these were
restored in separate legislation in the late 1990s. See H.R. REP. No. 104-327 (1995). Further modifica-
tions to agency reporting requirements were made under the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-352, 124 Star. 3866.
55. Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What
You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 134(-41 (1996) ("More than any other nation, we have cast a
broad vote of confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the markets, and in the transparency not just
of the markets but of the underlying companies.").
56. Researching Public Companies Through EDGAR: A Guide for Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, available at https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/edgarguide.htm#P242 26995 (last visited July
17, 2014).
57. The SEC's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system (EDGAR) is a search-
able database that "performs automated collection, validation, indexing, acceptance, and forwarding
of submissions by companies and others who are required by law to file forms with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)." Important Information About EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm (last visited July 17, 2014). As the SEC explains,
EDGAR's "primary purpose is to increase the efficiency and fairness of the securities market for the
benefit of investors, corporations, and the economy by accelerating the receipt, acceptance, dissemina-
tion, and analysis of time-sensitive corporate information filed with the agency." Id.
58. See Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan.
26, 2009).
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formational edge that privileged investors routinely attain from their
connections to the inside of government. 59 Instead, the initiatives were
generally directed at making government data more accessible.
An important step toward this goal of accessibility occurred in May
2013, when the President issued an executive order that makes "open
and machine readable" the new default rule for the release of govern-
ment information.60 The Executive Order did not mention equitable in-
vestor access to information as a rationale for the initiative, but it did say
that open access to information was important "[t]o promote continued
job growth, Government efficiency, and the social good that can be
gained from opening Government data to the public . . ,,6' The OMB
simultaneously sent a memorandum to agency heads providing specific
guidelines for implementation of the Executive Order, and instructed all
executive branch departments and independent agencies to develop new
procedures and protocols to more effectively manage "information as an
asset" throughout its life cycle. 62 The memorandum emphasized at the
outset that "[i]nformation is a valuable national resource and a strategic
asset to the Federal Government, its partners, and the public. 63
B. Generally Applicable Provisions that Protect Confidential
Government Information
Needless to say, not all government information is even supposed to
be publicly available. National security and other classified information
is protected under an elaborate regulatory scheme that subjects leakers
to criminal liability 4 Nonclassified confidential information is subject to
protection under omnibus statutes such as the Trade Secrets Act and the
Privacy Act, but many of these statutes do not apply to congressional of-
ficials or employees. 65 Officials and employees in the executive branch
59. See generally Open Government Initiative, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, Http://www.whitehouse.gov/
open (last visited July 17, 2014).
60. See Exec. Order No. 13,642, 78 Fed. Reg. 28,111 (May 9, 2013). The Executive Order in-
structed the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to consult with the Chief In-
formation Officer, Chief Technology Officer, and the Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), and to issue an "Open Data Policy to advance the management of Gov-
ernment information as an asset .... " Id. The Executive Order also made clear that "[w]hen imple-
menting the Open Data Policy, agencies shall incorporate a full analysis of privacy, confidentiality, and
security risks into each stage of the information lifecycle to identify information that should not be
released." Id.
61. Id.
62. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM FOR THE
HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-13.pdf. The OMB memorandum requires "agencies
to collect or create information in a way that supports downstream information processing and dissem-
ination activities" and further states that "[t]his includes using machine readable and open formats,
data standards, and common core and extensible metadata for all new information creation and collec-
tion efforts." Id. at 1 2. The Memorandum also requires agencies to review information "for privacy,
confidentiality, security, or other restrictions to release." Id. at 2.
63. Id.
64. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21900, THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 10 (2013).
65. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012).
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must also comply with regulations promulgated by the Office of Gov-
ernment Ethics as well as the regulations issued by the particular agency
they serve. And Congress operates under its own set of provisions which
are, in general, much less stringent than the provisions applicable to the
other two branches.
1. National Security and Other Classified Information
The government protects information that is important to national
security through a formal process for classifying the information in vari-
ous categories: "confidential," "secret," "top secret," and "sensitive
compartmentalized information" ("SCI").66 The Information Security
Oversight Office ("ISOO"), a unit of the National Archives, monitors
the process for classifying, declassifying, and handling classified infor-
mation. Criminal statutes prohibit unauthorized disclosure of classified
information67 as well as disclosure of other information vital to the na-
tional defense. 68 Although the government is usually successful in pro-
tecting classified information, the Wikileaks scandal in 201169 as well as
Edward Snowden's 2013 disclosures about classified electronic eaves-
dropping operations70 show the vulnerability of even the most concerted
efforts to prevent disclosure of government information.
2. Omnibus Statutes Protecting Nonclassified Confidential Information
The Trade Secrets Act,71 entitled "Disclosure of Confidential In-
formation Generally," is the broadest statutory bar on unauthorized dis-
closure of confidential information. It provides that:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of
any department or agency thereof,... publishes, divulges, discloses,
or makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by
law any information coming to him in the course of his employment
or official duties ... which information concerns or relates to the
trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or
to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any
income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partner-
ship, corporation, or association; or permits any income return or
copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or particulars
thereof to be seen or examined by any person except as provided by
66. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT 3 (2004).
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 798 (providing criminal penalties for the disclosure of classified information).
68. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793 94 (covering the gathering, transmitting, losing, or delivering of
defense information).
69. See Hearing on the Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by Wik-
iLeaks Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010).
70. Mark Hosenball, NSA Chief: Snowden Leaked up to 200,000 Secret Documents, REUTERS
(Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/14/us-usa-security-nsa-idUSBRE9AD19B2013
1114.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1905.
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law; shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment.72
Although originally intended to protect trade secrets from unau-
thorized disclosure by federal IRS agents," this provision of the Trade
Secrets Act covers a broad range of other unauthorized disclosures of
agency information. The Act has, for example, been held to apply to an
SEC official who allegedly disclosed information about a securities inves-
tigation to assist a friend with a civil lawsuit against a third party,74 and to
a Customs Service employee who disclosed information from a law en-
forcement database to a friend who was under investigation.7 5 The Act
has been challenged for apparent vagueness, but courts have rejected this
claim, pointing out that the Act covers disclosure only of information
that is designated as "confidential" pursuant to agency policy or regula-
tions.76 The term confidential has been interpreted to require "at least
that the government agency in question have an official policy that the
information not be disclosed (or that nondisclosure be mandated by stat-
ute or regulation)."'77
Several agencies, including the Department of Defense,78 the IRS,79
the OMB, ° and the Department of Veterans Affairs1 have warnings
72. Id.
73. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 296 97 (1979) ("Congress was primarily con-
cerned with unauthorized disclosure of business information by feckless or corrupt revenue agents,
for in the early days of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it was the field agents who had substantial
contact with confidential financial information." (footnote omitted)).
74. See Hunter v. Heffernan, No. CIV. A. 94-5340, 1996 WL 694237, at *1 2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26
1996) (citing the Trade Secrets Act and concluding that the Act "expressly prohibited" the defendant
from "disclosing confidential financial information [he had] obtained in a securities fraud investigation
of plaintiff to his former girlfriend ... and to her attorney for their use in pursuing a civil claim against
plaintiff").
75. See United States v. Wallington, 889 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir.1989) (upholding criminal convic-
tion of Customs Service employee who used a confidential law enforcement database to check federal
and state records of several individuals, at the request of a friend who, believing she was under investi-
gation in connection with the murder of her husband, wanted the confidential information to assist her
attorney with her defense).
76. Id. at 577 (emphasizing the statutory heading "Disclosure of Confidential Information Gen-
erally" and other evidence that Congress only intended to prohibit disclosures of confidential infor-
mation).
77. Id. at 579. Wallington held "that section 1905 prohibits the disclosure of information by a
federal employee only if the information is confidential, at least in the sense that it is the official policy
of the agency in question (or is otherwise required by statute or regulation) that the information not
be released." Id. at 577.
78. See U.S Department of Defense, Standards of Conduct Office, Non-Senior Employee Post-
Government, Employment Restrictions (January 2014), available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/
defense ethics/resource-library/pgser-nonsenior.pdf ("Even though you have left Government ser-
vice, you still may not use nonpublic information to further your own private interests, or those of an-
other, including your subsequent employer. Nonpublic information includes classified information,
source selection data, information protected by the Privacy Act, proprietary information, information
protected by the Trade Secrets Act, and other information that has not been made available to the
public and is exempt from disclosure.").
79. See Memorandum from Charles B. Christopher, Chief counsel I.R.S., to Lorraine M.
Thompson, Senior Tax Analyst, (Oct. 23, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta008
21_7295.pdf (referencing the Trade Secrets Act).
80. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM FOR
CHIEF ACQUISITIONS OFFICERS, SENIOR PROCUREMENT EXECUTIVES, CHIEF INFORMATION
OFFICERS 10 (2012), http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/staffoffices/OFPP-Myth-Busting2.pdf ("In many
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about compliance with the Act in their employee handbooks and memo-
randa. The Office of Legal Counsel of the DOJ, however, has concluded
that the Act does not apply to official capacity communications between
officials at different federal agencies.' Agencies that exchange infor-
mation sometimes enter into a memorandum of understanding to protect
information and assure compliance with the Act. 3 Moreover, the Act's
prohibition does not apply to disclosure of information generally availa-
ble to the public.'
Although the Trade Secrets Act prohibition is broad, it does not
cover many instances of selective disclosure because much government
information is not confidential pursuant to agency policy, regulations, or
statutes. This information may not be publicly disseminated at the time
it is selectively disclosed by an agency employee, but it is still not confi-
dential within the meaning of the Act. Moreover, agency heads and oth-
er senior agency officials have enormous discretion over whether infor-
mation is in fact categorized as "confidential" and the circumstances
under which exceptions can be made. 5 Thus, the revelation of nonpublic
information by agency heads and other senior agency officials often can-
not be deemed "unauthorized by law" within the meaning of the Trade
Secrets Act. 6
The 1974 Privacy Act also protects information from disclosure by
government agencies in order to prevent potential harm to private par-
ties. 7 The OMB has responsibility for administering the Act.8 The Act's
cases, the Trade Secrets Act will prohibit Federal employees from divulging protected information,
including confidential commercial or financial data, trade secrets, operations, processes, or style of
work. Also, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) allows agencies to protect commercial or finan-
cial information that is privileged or confidential.").
81. See DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT 10 (1998), available at http://wwwl.va.gov/vapubs/viewPublication.asp?Pub-
ID=22&FType=2 (noting that "trade secrets and other confidential business information furnished to
VA from outside the Government" may be withheld from responses to FOIA requests).
82. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL
COUNSEL OFFICE OF FEDERAL HOUSING ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT (1999), available at http://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1999/04/31/op-olc-vO23-pOO74.pdf ("[W]e conclude that the
type of inter-agency, official purpose disclosures set forth in your letter would be 'authorized by law'
within the meaning of the Trade Secrets Act and therefore would not violate that act.").
83. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN
THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AND THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION 3 (2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/
MemorandaofUnderstandingMOUs/DomesticMOUs/ucm212905.htm ("Both agencies recognize and
acknowledge, however, that it is essential that any confidential information that is shared between
FDA and CDC must be protected from unauthorized public disclosure.").
84. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) ("Information that is public
knowledge or that is generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret.").
85. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294 (1979) ("We therefore conclude that
Congress did not limit an agency's discretion to disclose information when it enacted the FOIA.").
86. But see id. at 298 301 (rejecting the argument that the Act is "essentially an 'anti-leak' stat-
ute that does not bind the heads of governmental departments or agencies" and emphasizing that "the
appropriate inquiry is whether [agency] regulations provide the 'authoriz[ation] by law' required by
the statute").
87. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C § 552a (2012).
88. Id. § 552a(v).
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chief purpose is to protect personal privacy 9 and requires agencies to al-
low individuals increased control over the gathering, dissemination, and
accuracy of information about them.90 Generally, the Act prohibits fed-
eral agencies from disclosing any "record" to "any person, or to another
agency.... "91 The Act defines "record" as any (a) "item, collection, or
grouping of information about an individual" that is (b) "maintained by
an agency" and (c) contains that individual's identifying information. 92
The Act lists several items that fall within the ambit of identifying infor-
mation, including: an individual's "name, or the identifying number,
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as
a finger or voice print or a photograph[.] ' 93 The Act also identifies five
classes of "records" Congress specifically sought to protect from uncon-
sented disclosure.94 Protected records include, "but [are] not limited to,"
information relating to an individual's (1) "education," (2) "financial
transactions," and (3) medical, (4) criminal, or (5) employment history. 95
Congress explicitly carved out numerous exemptions to the general rule
that prohibits unconsented disclosures. 96 There are some exemptions for
disclosure between agencies-for example, for national security and law
enforcement purposes -and a broad congressional-disclosure exemption,
which allows agencies to disclose records to "either House of Congress"
and "any committee or subcommittee thereof" without threat of sanc-
tion.'
Finally, as discussed above, FOIA contains numerous exceptions
protecting certain types of agency information from disclosure.9 FOIA
recognizes that in these areas, either the government itself or a third par-
ty has an interest in keeping information confidential.
3. Office of Government Ethics Regulations
The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
Branch, promulgated by the Office of Government Ethics ("OGE"), in-
clude a rule pertaining to the use of nonpublic information.99 Its general
prohibition states: "An employee shall not engage in a financial transac-
tion using nonpublic information, nor allow the improper use of nonpub-
lic information to further his own private interest or that of another,
whether through advice or recommendation, or by knowing unauthor-
ized disclosure. '" 100
89. Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), 88 Star. 1896, 1896 (1974).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Devine v. United States, 202 F.3d 547, 550 (2d Cir. 2000).
91. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
92. Id. § 552a(a)(4).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., id. § 552a(b)(1) (12).
97. Id. § 552a(b)(9); see also Devine v. United States, 202 F.3d 547, 551 (2d Cir. 2000).
98. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
99. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703 (2013).
100. Id. § 2635.703(a). For purposes of this prohibition, nonpublic information is defined as:
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The phrase "knowing," together with the rest of the provision, im-
plies some knowledge by the employee not only that a disclosure is unau-
thorized but that the information will be used in a financial transaction.
The OGE provides five specific examples in the rule itself. One of
these examples involves a federal employee purchasing stock in a de-
fense contractor that will be awarded a Navy contract, which the OGE
observes may violate both the rule and federal insider trading laws.1 1
Although that example also warns against advising "friends or relatives"
to purchase stock, neither that example nor any of the others involve se-
lective disclosure of nonpublic information to outsiders for apparently
legitimate reasons. Private briefings of the sort that Treasury Secretary
Paulson gave to hedge fund and private equity managers in the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis, for instance, are not addressed in the examples.
Another common scenario -discussion of nonpublic government infor-
mation at political fundraisers and other unofficial social events-also is
not mentioned in any of the examples accompanying the rule or in sub-
sequent interpretive guidance on the rule. Some agencies -including the
SEC-provide interpretive guidance on the rule for their own employ-
ees." But much of this guidance simply restates the text of the OGE
rule and does not address situations where agency officials are not seek-
ing to personally benefit from their selective disclosures. Private brief-
ings and meetings may be a legitimate means of gathering valuable feed-
back, insight, and analysis from the investment community.
4. Agency-Specific Regulations and Policies
a. A Snapshot of Typical Provisions
Many federal agencies have specific rules, policies, and procedures
for protecting confidential information from disclosure. For example, in
its Rules of Conduct for Employees, the Department of the Treasury
information that the employee gains by reason of Federal employment and that he knows or rea-
sonably should know has not been made available to the general public. It includes information
that he knows or reasonably should know: (1) Is routinely exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
552 or otherwise protected from disclosure by statute, Executive order or regulation; (2) Is desig-
nated as confidential by an agency; or (3) Has not actually been disseminated to the general pub-
lic and is not authorized to be made available to the public on request.
Id. § 2635.703(b).
101. See id. § 2635.703 (Example 1) ("A Navy employee learns in the course of her duties that a
small corporation will be awarded a Navy contract for electrical test equipment. She may not take any
action to purchase stock in the corporation or its suppliers and she may not advise friends or relatives
to do so until after public announcement of the award. Such actions could violate Federal securities
statutes as well as this section.").
102. See Adoption of Supplemental Standards of Ethical Conduct for Members and Employees of
the Securities and Exchange Commission and Revisions to the Commission's Ethics Rules, 75 Fed.
Reg. 42,270 (July 20, 2010) ("Rule 2635.703(b) states that nonpublic information is information that
the individual gains through his or her Federal position, which the person knows or reasonably should
know is not available to the general public. Under this definition, nonpublic information includes in-
formation routinely exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 or
otherwise protected by statute, rule, or Executive Order; information that the Commission designates
as confidential; and information that is not generally available to the public and that the Commission
has not actually released or disseminated.").
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emphasizes both protection of confidential information and prompt dis-
closure of other information: "Employees shall not disclose official in-
formation without proper authority, pursuant to Department or bureau
regulation. Employees authorized to make disclosures should respond
promptly and courteously to requests from the public for information
when permitted to do so by law."10 3 The Department of Commerce also
has rules for the protection of information provided by third parties as
well as rules assuring that information that is not confidential is publicly
disclosed upon request.1 4 The DOJ provides guidance on disclosure of
confidential information in public speeches, 10 5 and reminds employees of
OGE regulations banning use or disclosure of nonpublic information for
use in financial transactions.1 6 The Department of State seeks to protect
broad categories of "sensitive but unclassified" ("SBU") information.1 7
The Department of Energy,0 8 the Department of the Interior,1 9 and the
Department of Housing & Urban Affairs110 likewise provide guidelines
on the handling of confidential information.
103. 31 C.F.R. § 0.206 (citations omitted); see also id. § 1.10(b) ("Information with respect to ac-
tivities of the Department not a matter of record shall not be disclosed if the information involves mat-
ters exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552 or the regulations in this part, or if the disclosure of
such information would give the person requesting the information advantages not accorded to other
citizens.").
104. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 30.60 (providing for the confidentiality of electronic export infor-
mation).
105. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ETHICS HANDBOOK 5 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/
ethics/ethics-handbook.pdf ("When you are teaching, speaking or writing in your private capacity, you
may not use nonpublic information, nor should there be any use of your official title except as a bio-
graphical detail or where there is a disclaimer.").
106. Id. at 9 ("You may not engage in a financial transaction using nonpublic information or allow
the use of such information to further your private interests or those of another. Nonpublic infor-
mation is information you gain on the job and which has not been made available to the general public
and is not authorized to be made available on request.").
107. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL VOLUME 12: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY 1
(2011), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/88404.pdf ("Sensitive but unclassified (SBU)
information is information that is not classified for national security reasons, but that war-
rants/requires administrative control and protection from public or other unauthorized disclosure for
other reasons."); see also id. at 3 ("Before distributing any SBU information, employees must be sure
that such distribution is permissible and, when required, specifically authorized. (See 5 FAM 470.)").
108. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, HANDBOOK ON OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS 42 (2011), http://energy.
gov/hc/downloads/handbook-overseas-assignments ("The Staff Member, as a U.S. Government em-
ployee, is subject to 18 U.S.C. 1905, which specifies punishment for unauthorized disclosure of confi-
dential information by fine or imprisonment, or both, and removal from office or employment.").
109. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL 9 (2012), available at http://elips.
doi.gov/elips/Browse.aspx?startid=1552&dbid=0 ("Employees may engage in public communications
regarding the programs, operations, and activities of the Department, including matters related to
their official duties, or based primarily on knowledge acquired through official duties, provided
that ... [t]hey do not disclose information protected from disclosure by statute, regulation, Executive
Order, or other Executive Branch or Departmental policies or directives, including classified infor-
mation and controlled unclassified information such as personally identifiable information, and infor-
mation protected by the Trade Secrets Act, 18 USC § 1905, Privacy Act, 5 USC §552(a), and Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (FOIA).").
110. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY POLICY 1
(2013), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddocid=240025C1UH.pdf ("Information security
policies are designed to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and value of assets, as well
as ensure the continued delivery of services. They also establish the appropriate focus and standards
for acceptable security practices across an organization. This policy is based on federal regulations
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At least one agency, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
("FHFA"), specifically addresses the implicit violation of the OGE rule
barring misuse of confidential information that occurs when an agency
employee makes an investment recommendation concerning the securi-
ties of a regulated entity. The FHFA, working with the staff of OGE,
drafted its own ethics rules prohibiting FHFA employees from making
such recommendations.111 As the FHFA explained:
[Section 9001.108 of the FHFA ethics rules] supplements 5 CFR
2635.703 in that it expressly prohibits FHFA employees from using
or creating the appearance of using information that is not available
to the general public to further a private interest. The prohibition is
also intended to eliminate any misunderstanding or harm that could
result from such a recommendation. For example, an investor
should not be misled into believing, pursuant to the recommenda-
tion of an FHFA employee, that the securities of a particular regu-
lated entity regulated by FHFA is a sound buy because the investor
believes that the employee may have access to inside information.112
The FHFA rule does not, however, expressly address a situation where a
FHFA employee does not go so far as to make an implicit "recommenda-
tion" but nonetheless selectively discloses nonpublic information about a
regulated entity to an outside person who the employee knows is likely
to be trading in securities markets.
Other agencies provide their employees with specific and targeted
warnings about certain disclosures to persons outside the agency. The
Air Force, for instance, is particularly concerned about disclosure of con-
fidential information in employment negotiations with the private sector
and thus warns that "[e]mployees may not disclose 'non-public infor-
mation' to companies with which they are seeking employment.1 113 Yet
another problematic context in the military, as well as in other parts of
the government, is inadvertent disclosure of confidential information to
federal contractors who are present in the federal workplace. 114 The De-
partment of Defense advises that nonpublic information should not be
released to contractors unless the information is within the scope of the
contract, there is a "need to know," and the contactor's employees have
signed a nondisclosure agreement. 115 And the Department of Homeland
and highlights HUD's goals and requirements for protecting its information and information system
assets.").
111. 5 C.F.R. § 9001.108 (2013) ("Employees shall not make any recommendation or suggestion,
directly or indirectly, concerning the acquisition, sale, or divestiture of securities of a regulated enti-
ty.").
112. Supplemental Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Federal Housing Finance
Agency, 75 Fed. Reg. 52,607-01 (Aug. 27, 2010).
113. AIR FORCE MATERIAL COMMAND LAW OFFICE, DESKTOP ETHICS GUIDE FOR AIR FORCE
MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES 17 (1998), http://www.robins.af.mil/shared/media/document/afd-090115-
084.pdf.
114. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ETHICS ISSUES INVOLVING CONTRACTORS IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE 18 (2006), http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/defense-ethics/resource-library/contractors-
inworkplace.pdf (citing 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703).
115. Id. at 19 ("No information should be provided contractor employees unless they have exe-
cuted a non-disclosure agreement.").
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Security ("DHS") is particularly careful about protecting a category of
information called "personally identifiable information" ("PII") from
abuse. 116 Although the contemplated abuses presumably do not involve
misuse of information for trading in financial markets, DHS procedures
for protecting confidential nonclassified information are more detailed
than in many agencies.
b. Additional Precautions for Market-Sensitive Information
Most agency policies on the disclosure of nonpublic information do
not discuss specifically the fact that some such information is market sen-
sitive, although several agencies have responded explicitly to potential
abuses of agency information in commodities and securities markets.
Such agencies already go to great lengths to ensure that the release of
market-sensitive information to the public is handled in a way that is fair
to all investors.
The Department of Agriculture ("USDA") was the first federal
agency to take this problem seriously after a 1905 scandal in which the
Department's cotton crop estimates were leaked to commodities traders
before they were publicly announced (a Department employee had
raised and lowered window shades to signal the general direction of the
crop estimates to speculators positioned across the street). 117 The De-
partment's Agricultural Statistics Service subsequently developed strict
procedures for release of crop estimates and similar confidential infor-
mation. The procedures, which are still in use, include sequestration of
nonpublic crop data in designated locations inside USDA buildings be-
hind armed guards118 (Much of this data is reported from regional offices
for compilation into national statistics.). Once a "lock-up" time begins
after the arrival of nonpublic crop data, persons entering the restricted
area-including in one instance a soda delivery man who inadvertently
entered to fill vending machines and in another instance the Secretary of
Agriculture himself -are not allowed to leave until the crop statistics are
publicly announced. 119 Sometimes this means having to stay overnight. 120
More recently, the Department of Labor ("DOL"), the Department
of the Treasury, and several other agencies, in response to a 2007 FBI
and SEC investigation of alleged leaks, reinforced security procedures
for release of market sensitive statistics such as the monthly Consumer
116. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., HANDBOOK FOR SAFEGUARDING SENSITIVE PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 4 (2011), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-guide-spii-
handbook.pdf ("Sensitive P11 is personally identifiable information, which if lost, compromised, or
disclosed without authorization, could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or
unfairness to an individual.").
117. See RICH ALLEN, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SAFEGUARDING AMERICA'S AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS: A CENTURY OF SUCCESSFUL AND SECURE PROCEDURES, 1905 2005, 1 2 (2007).
118. Id. at 23.
119. Id. at 32.
120. Id. at 23.
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Price Index, gas prices, home sales, and the unemployment rate.121 Such
data, like the USDA crop statistics, are kept inside a lockup room until
they are released to news organizations inside the lockup room at an ap-
pointed time. Amidst controversy in 2012, the DOL banned certain
news organizations from the lockup room upon learning that those news
organizations were operating as conduits for hedge funds and transmit-
ting the data instantly for trading purposes immediately upon release of
the data.2 Because many hedge funds use computerized trading pro-
grams that are determined in advance, instantaneous communication of
the DOL data to a hedge fund computer can almost instantaneously re-
sult in a trade, meaning trades are being placed from inside the govern-
ment lock-up room before the market as a whole has had an opportunity
to absorb the information. Other organizations were asked to replace
their computers in the lockup room with new computers that could not
be linked automatically to specialized trading models.123 The DOL's in-
tent is to provide its data only to genuine news organizations that will re-
lease the data to the public, or at least to a broad base of subscribers,
immediately upon release of DOL's news embargo.124
In 2000, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
amended its rules to prohibit disclosure of nonpublic internal Commis-
sion draft orders and other documents in market-sensitive proceedings.2
These rules also bar regulated entities and persons practicing before the
FCC from "further distribution or use" of any information that has been
inadvertently received from the FCC.26 The FCC specifically mentioned
that the new rule was responding to "recent" unauthorized disclosures
about market sensitive cases.127
The Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee
("FOMC"), which sets short-term interest rates for interbank loans, is
another obvious focal point for nonpublic market-sensitive infor-
mation.128 Although the FOIA requires federal agencies to produce cer-
121. See John H. Cushman, Jr., U.S. Tightens Security for Economic Data, N.Y. TIMES (July 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/business/labor-dept-tightens-security-for-market-sensitive-
data.html?_r=0 (reporting that the DOL guards the monthly CPI "with launch-code secrecy, a precau-
tion against anyone who might try to take advantage of an accidental or a surreptitious leak to gain an
insider's edge in the financial markets, turning milliseconds into millions").
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. 47 C.F.R. § 19.735 203 (2014).
126. Id.
127. See Amendment of Section 19.735-203, 15 FCC Rcd. 20,622, 20,622 (Oct. 18, 2000) ("The
purpose of the amendment is to emphasize the responsibilities of Commission employees in this area
and to provide guidance to persons who receive nonpublic documents under circumstances where it
appears that the release of the documents was either inadvertent or otherwise unauthorized.").
128. Congress in 12 U.S.C. § 263 created the FOMC, which consists of members of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and five representatives of the Federal Reserve banks
elected annually by members of the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve is required to keep records of action on policy relating to open-market operations under 12
U.S.C. § 247a. See 12 C.F.R. § 271.7 (2014) (concerning the FMOC's disclosure of its records).
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tain information upon request,129 many records of the FOMC are exempt
from disclosure.130 There is also a broad regulatory prohibition against
disclosure of FOMC information. Nonetheless, there have been inci-
dents where selective disclosure of FOMC information has been alleged,
including when the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
claimed in 2007 that then-New York Fed Chairman and FOMC member
Timothy Geithner had shared with Bank of America too much infor-
mation about a planned rate cut.132
In June of 2011, perhaps in response to earlier incidents of selective
disclosure, the FOMC adopted a "Policy on External Communications of
Committee Participants." FOMC participants must "carefully safeguard
all confidential information." '133 In addition, "[n]o confidential FOMC
information may be released except pursuant to Committee instructions
or with written authorization from the Chairman and prompt notification
to the FOMC." '134 Moreover, Committee members must "refrain from
describing their personal views about monetary policy in any meeting or
conversation with any individual, firm, or organization who could profit
financially from acquiring that information unless those views have al-
ready been expressed in their public communications.113 5 The FOMC
policy imposes a blackout period on monetary policy communications,
during which participants must "refrain from expressing their views
about macroeconomic developments or monetary policy issues in meet-
ings or conversations with members of the public." '136
The FOMC in June of 2012 reaffirmed its policy in a "Program for
Security of FOMC Information," which also defines confidential FOMC
information that cannot be released to the public:
Confidential FOMC information includes all privileged information
that comes into the possession of the governors, Federal Reserve
Bank presidents, or Federal Reserve System staff in the perfor-
mance of their duties for, or pursuant to the direction of, the Com-
mittee. Such information covers, but is not limited to, expressions
of policy views at FOMC meetings, reasons for those views, votes of
129. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012).
130. 12 C.F.R. § 271.7(a) (2014).
131. Id. § 271.7(e) ("Except as provided in this part, no officer, employee, or agent of the Com-
mittee or any Federal Reserve Bank shall disclose or permit the disclosure of any unpublished infor-
mation of the Committee to any person (other than Committee officers, employees, or agents properly
entitled to such information for the performance of official duties).").
132. See Nelson D. Schwartz, Transcripts Revive a Tiff of Two Fed Presidents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/business/transcripts-revive-a-tiff of-two-fed-presidents.
html.
133. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FOMC POLICY ON EXTERNAL
COMMUNICATIONS OF COMMITTEE PARTICIPANTS 1 (2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetary
policy/files/FOMC ExtCommunicationParticipants.pdf.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2.
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the Committee, and staff forecasts. The information that must be
kept confidential may be in any form.137
This information is categorized into three different classes, with different
treatments for each class.1" Most confidential FOMC documents are
publicly available after a lag time of about five years.139
The Federal Reserve in 2012 issued a separate policy on external
communications by Federal Reserve System Staff.140 The policy is similar
to that for FOMC members.141
C. Policies and Customs in Congress
Although much information known to Congress, or to congressional
committees and individual members and their staffs, is undoubtedly
"nonpublic," there is substantial uncertainty as to whether and when
such information can or should be regarded as "confidential." On the
one hand, Congress supports a "fundamental policy" that generally fa-
vors "openness and public access to information." 142 Among other plac-
es, this policy is reflected in the Constitution's dictate that "[e]ach House
shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secre-
cy .... "143 On the other hand, as a former Chief Counsel of both the
Senate and House Ethics Committees has observed, "[t]he rules of some
committees.., explicitly impose obligations of confidentiality on com-
mittee members and staff with respect to committee information ... [or]
with respect to specific classes of information. 1 44 He pointed to the eth-
ics committees and the intelligence committees of both the House and
the Senate as principal examples, but he emphasized as well that "[t]he
rules of many other committees of the House and Senate [ ] do not im-
137. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., PROGRAM FOR SECURITY OF FOMC IN-
FORMATION 1 (2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMCInformationSecurity
Program.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 3.
140. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FOMC POLICY ON EXTERNAL
COMMUNICATIONS OF FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM STAFF (2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/files/FOMCExtCommunicationStaff.pdf. The policy instructs staff members to "re-
frain from disseminating information outside the Federal Reserve System" unless it has already been
made "widely available to the public," and it references, in particular, "information about economic
and financial conditions or about the methods and tools that are currently being used to assess those
conditions, that might allow an individual, firm, or organization to profit financially." Id. 5. The
policy further provides that "[s]taff will strive to ensure that their contacts with members of the public
do not provide any profit-making person, firm, or organization with a prestige advantage over its com-
petitors" and that staff members "will consider this principle carefully and rigorously in considering
invitations to speak at meetings sponsored by profit-making organizations and in scheduling meetings
with anyone who might benefit financially from apparently-exclusive contacts with Federal Reserve
staff." Id. 6.
141. Seeid. at I nn.1 2.
142. 138 CONG. REC. S17835-04 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. George Mitchell).
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
144. See The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act: Hearing on H.R. 1148 Before the H.
Comm. on Financial Serv., 112th Cong. 100 01 (Dec. 6, 2011) (written statement of Robert L. Walker,
of Counsel, Wiley Rein LLP).
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pose any specific duties of confidentiality with respect to committee in-
formation."14 5
In theory at least, the consequences for revealing confidential con-
gressional information may be severe. In the Senate, Standing Rule
29(5) provides that:
Any Senator, officer, or employee of the Senate who shall disclose
the secret or confidential business or proceedings of the Senate, in-
cluding the business and proceedings of the committees, subcom-
mittees, and offices of the Senate, shall be liable, if a Senator, to
suffer expulsion from the body; and if an officer or employee, to
dismissal from the service of the Senate, and to punishment for con-
tempt.146
In the view of some, including former Senate Majority Leader George
Mitchell, "the words secret and confidential [as used in the rule] refer to
all information the Senate treats as confidential, including information
received in closed session, information obtained in the confidential phas-
es of investigations, and classified national security information." '147 Alt-
hough there does not appear to be an antileak analogue to Rule 29(5) in
the House, the revelation of certain types of confidential information by
members of either chamber or their staffs could nonetheless be sanc-
tioned as a type of "disorderly behaviour." '148 Of course, all of this begs
the question as to what it means for information in Congress to be
"treated" as confidential.
The nebulous meaning of "confidentiality" in Congress is a likely
explanation for why breaches occur routinely and disciplinary actions are
rare. Indeed, many view Capitol Hill as a place "where leaking infor-
mation is as burnished an art form as backslapping and grinning on de-
mand."149 To take just one instance of the dissonance: When Senator
Bernie Sanders (I-VT) posted on his congressional website proprietary
trading data that were provided to the Commodity Futures Trading
145. Id. at 102.
146. THE STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at R.
XXIX(5) (2012), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/SMAN-112/pdf/SMAN-112-pg55.pdf.
147. 138 CONG. REC. S17835-04 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. George Mitchell). The
placement, however, of Rule 29(5) among other subparagraphs under the general caption "Execu-
tive Sessions" could support a different interpretation that would narrow that rule considerably to
only executive and treaty-related communications. See Andrew George, Public (Self)-Service: Illegal
Trading on Confidential Congressional Information, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 161, 167 (2008)
(acknowledging narrow reading based on placement, but favoring broad construction by Senator
Mitchell).
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, pun-
ish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and with the Concurrence of two-thirds, expel a Member.");
see In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669 70 (1897) (observing that the right to punish "extends to all cases
where the offence is such as in the judgment of the Senate [or the House of Representatives] is incon-
sistent with the trust and duty of a member").
149. Editorial, Shh! Senate at Work on a National Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2013, http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/08/03/opinion/shh-senate-at-work-on-a-national-secret.html?-r=0 (commenting on
a plan by leaders of the Senate Finance Committee to encourage candid views from members on
which tax credits and deductions should be stricken from the tax code, and sardonically observing that
the press "got word of the secret secrecy plan from one of the capital's ubiquitous anonymous
sources").
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Commission ("CFTC") by investment banks pursuant to a stipulation of
confidentiality, he later defended his actions as an "appropriate [way] to
lift the veil of secrecy in the oil futures market," which furthered the
general public's "right to know how much excessive speculation has driv-
en up oil prices and which Wall Street firms are doing it. '150  Senator
Sanders' decision to release the information generated disapproval from
some colleagues as well as criticism by former CFTC commissioners 151
and the Futures Industry Association ("FIA").152 But legal experts gen-
erally agreed that what he did was not illegal, 153 and the incident did not
result in official discipline by the Senate. Moreover, any investigation
(much less prosecution) by government officials outside the Senate
would have been thwarted by the Constitution's Speech or Debate
Clause, which shields lawmakers and their staffs from being "questioned
in any other Place" about legislative acts. 154
III. COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS AND TRADEOFFS
CURTAILING SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS BASED ON POLITICAL
INTELLIGENCE
The path toward fairer government disclosure-and the concomi-
tant reduction of securities trading based on political intelligence -will
require a careful balancing of many interests and priorities. Indeed, a
whole range of constitutional and policy considerations must be taken
into account with any approach to regulating selective disclosure that
risks interfering with the rights of citizens to engage in conversations
with government officials about their concerns, hopes, and grievances.
Curbing the practice of selective disclosure, for instance, could impede
transparency and could insulate government processes and decision-
150. Bernie Sanders, Editorial, Wall Street's Secret Oil Games, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 16,
2011), www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/wall-streets-secret-oil-g_b_966286.html.
151. James E. Newsome & Fred Hatfield, Editorial, Sen. Bernie Sanders Market Data Leak De-
serves Investigation, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/sen-bernie-
sanderss-market -data-leak-deserves-investigation/2011/09/08/gIQA0fiEDK story.html (contending
that the futures market data were "submitted in good faith by various individuals and companies in
energy and other commodities with the understanding that they will be protected by law, because of
the information's proprietary nature and value").
152. Daniel P. Collins, FIA Outraged over Leaked Info, FUTURES MAG. (Oct. 1, 2011), http://
www.futuresmag.com/2011/10/01/fia-outraged-over-leaked-info (quoting FIA letter to CFTC stating
that its members were "shocked and outraged by the disclosure of confidential data on derivatives
market positions" and that the leak "poses a serious threat to the confidence of market participants in
the CFTC's ability to protect proprietary information").
153. Brian Scheid, Legal Sources Do Not Believe Sanders Energy Trading Data Leak Violates
Law, PLATTS GAS MKT. REP., Sept. 2, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 18455785.
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The practical result is that congressional self-discipline is the
sole avenue for addressing ethical transgressions involving legislative activity. But see Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 27 (1972) (holding that while the Speech or Debate Clause protects a
senator and his aide who read the top-secret classified "Pentagon Papers" into the public record of a
subcommittee proceeding, the Clause did not protect their arrangement with a private party to publish
the classified documents in a book because that action was not related to the "due functioning of the
legislative process").
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making from scrutiny by outside persons and organizations. And an
overly harsh policy against selective disclosure might also interfere with
the ability of government officials to learn valuable information from
their interaction with important constituencies: information exchange be-
tween government and outsiders is often a process of give and take, and
preventing information from unfairly reaching some investors should not
come at the expense of government officials getting the information they
156
need to do their jobs.
A second tradeoff to consider is whether policymakers should err
on the side of over-policing or under-policing the disclosure of material
nonpublic government information. The principal argument that poli-
cymakers should err on the side of under-policing is that an overly ag-
gressive Fairer Government Disclosure ("FGD") regime might signifi-
cantly reduce transparency by discouraging disclosure of nonpublic
information to anybody. Indeed, a strict FGD regime could even be used
by political superiors as a way to keep subordinates from talking with the
press, notwithstanding the fact that an occasional leak may be beneficial
to the overarching goal of government transparency. 157  On the other
hand, over-policing by encouraging or requiring public disclosure of co-
pious amounts of government information does not undermine the
transparency norm, but public disclosure of too much information could
in some instances undermine government effectiveness.
Yet another tradeoff is between government interests -in fairer dis-
closure, agency or legislative effectiveness, and transparency- and the
interests of third parties in keeping information confidential. Infor-
mation about government policy (e.g., a new regulation or the Fed
changing the discount rate), or economically significant statistical infor-
mation the government has compiled (e.g., USDA crop reports, DOL
employment statistics) usually is not affected by this tradeoff. Other in-
formation, however, also belongs to private persons who expect that it
will be kept confidential and in some cases have a legal right to have it
kept confidential.158  A host of statutes already protect much of this in-
formation from selective disclosure. 159 Thus, in instances where selective
disclosure would violate the rights or legitimate expectations of a third
party, an FGD regime that emphasizes public disclosure of information
as a prophylactic measure will not be a viable alternative.
155. See GAO POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY, supra note 32, at 21 (observing that some inter-
viewees emphasized that "under the First Amendment there is a constitutional right to participate in
the political process and that [the proposed registration and reporting requirements] could impede
that process").
156. See id. (discussing observations by some that a "slowdown of communication could []affect
Congress as they often consult with interested parties when crafting legislation which could in some
cases be considered political intelligence").
157. See Pozen, supra note 27, at 14-16 (discussing the various rationales for leaking).
158. See supra notes 149 54 and accompanying text (discussing Senator Bernie Sanders's decision
in 2011 to post on his congressional website proprietary trading data provided by investment banks to
the CFTC).
159. See supra Part II.B.
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There will also be tradeoffs between fairer disclosure and the gov-
ernment's effectiveness. There are some situations where backroom
meetings-and the selective disclosure that comes with them-are need-
ed for an agency or the legislative branch to do its job. The DOJ and
federal regulatory agencies, for example, theoretically could be required
to conduct settlement negotiations for enforcement actions only in pub-
lic-live streaming settlement discussions on the agency website, includ-
ing all phone calls to opposing counsel. Such, however, would be a radi-
cal departure from the way in which settlement is currently handled and
settlement talks would probably be much less effective as a result.160 The
same may be true for bank inspections, negotiation of government con-
tracts, and many other interactions between the government and private
parties.
Government bailouts of private companies are regarded by some as
a bad idea, and the selective disclosure that comes with them is one of
many problems with bailouts. 16 But bailouts that do occur will probably
need to be negotiated the same way other corporate deals are negotiated,
which is usually in private until a deal is announced. 16  Requiring the
government to conduct all negotiations in public -and not to approach in
private the potential third-party buyers of a failed entity-would severely
compromise the government's negotiating position and could cost tax-
payers billions of dollars. 163 In most of these contexts, however, disclo-
sure of information to uninvolved third parties may not be necessary.164
And in instances where such disclosure does in fact further an important
government objective, steps can be taken to curtail the risk of securities
• • 165
trading on the basis of material nonpublic government information.
Furthermore, there are institutional considerations about whether
to use detailed rules or standards to achieve fairer government disclo-166
sure. Government decision-makers and their lawyers often prefer de-
tailed rules, but rules can be difficult to draft for a problem as broad and
sometimes elusive as the selective disclosure of political intelligence.
Rules can sometimes be easy to avoid because they are under-inclusive,
and in other instances rules have unintended consequences because they
160. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Protecting Settlement Negotiations, 6 FOIA UPDATE 4 (1985),
available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-updatesiVolVI-4/page3.htm (noting that confidentiality
of settlement agreements should be supported by exemptions from the FOIA).
161. See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Compromised Fiduciaries: Conflicts of Interest in Gov-
ernment and Business, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1680 (2011).
162. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Employing Novel Ways of Negotiating Merger Deals, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/employing-novel-ways-of-negotiating-
merger-deals/ (observing that secrecy in negotiations creates value and needs to be protected).
163. See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, SEVEN SECRETS FOR NEGOTIATING WITH GOVERNMENT 35
(2008) (noting efficiency of "purely private" negotiations).
164. See supra notes 1 3 and accompanying text (detailing media accounts of the July 2008 private
meeting between then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and about a dozen hedge fund and pri-
vate equity firm managers).
165. See Nagy & Painter, supra note 21, at 1360 (suggesting greater use of confidentiality agree-
ments with non-use components).
166. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 568-69, 621 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 956 57 (1995).
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are over-inclusive. For example, a detailed selective disclosure rule on
communications with the press might discourage an agency employee
from disclosing information to a newspaper reporter because the em-
ployee did not have time to verify the reporter's representation that his
media organization did not provide advance news flashes to hedge funds.
Standards, on the other hand, can sometimes be applied with a "rule of
reason" approach, and without constantly having to consult agency law-
yers. Decision-makers, however, are often nervous about standards that
can be interpreted differently after the fact (whether information was
subsequently used by someone for securities trading might be a factor
that influences an adjudicator's determination made, with hindsight bias,
about whether a regulatory standard prohibited its selective disclosure).
There is also the institutional choice between centralized decision-
making and ensuring uniformity across the government (for example, by
Congress in a federal statute), or decentralized decision-making by indi-
vidual agencies and the diversity of approaches that comes with the de-
centralized approach. Imposing too much uniformity in government leak
plugging and/or levee lowering raises concerns, as the agencies, their du-
ties, and the types of information they possess are so different. Also,
Congress when it imposes rules may not attach great value to agency ef-
fectiveness, perhaps preferring that political intelligence disclosures be a
privilege reserved for members of the legislative branch. (Congress has
rarely imposed uniformity in ethics rules across all three branches of
167government, and often the rules crafted for the legislative branch are
more lenient.16) On the other hand, there is reason to worry about agen-
cy officials abusing the discretion Congress gives them in this area to ei-
ther (1) accommodate selective disclosure they want for political rather
than policy reasons, and/or (2) "over-classify" information as confiden-
tial to reduce transparency. 169 One answer to this problem might be a
statutory provision setting forth the procedures by which agencies can
make decisions about selective disclosure (for example, a statute requir-
ing that these determinations be made in agency rulemaking pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act, including public notice and com-
ment).
Finally, any attempts to curb securities trading based on political in-
telligence will encounter serious constitutional and policy difficulties if
167. See, e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Owning Stock While Making Law: An Agency Problem and a Fi-
duciary Solution, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567, 569 (emphasizing that "the federal financial conflict
statutes guarding against self-interested decision making by executive and judicial branch officials do
not apply to Congress").
168. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lobbying Bill Sparks Populist Uprising on Both Sides, WASH.
POST, Mar. 6, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/05/AR200703050
1370_pf.html (describing Congressional efforts to impose disclosure requirements on executive offi-
cials in the Executive Branch Reform Act of 2007).
169. See Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 399, 401 (2009) ("In recent years, in fact, classification specifically overclassification
has increased .... "); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrecy: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing
Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 136 39 (2006) (discussing the dangers of over-
classification).
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government interferes with press freedom by telling news organizations
how and when to disseminate information to their subscribers. 170 Gov-
ernment agencies can appropriately insist on giving information to news
organizations with a broad subscription base before or at the same time
as it is given to news organizations that principally serve a narrow sub-
scription base (e.g., hedge funds). The DOL can, for example, seek to
admit to press conferences where statistical data are released those news
organizations with a broad subscription base, and the DOL may even be
able to exclude "news" organizations that instead focus on providing in-
stantaneous electronic communication of news to subscribers' computer-
ized trading programs (e.g., the "reporter" takes a picture of the data on
a DOL screen and the picture immediately results in execution of a trade
by a subscriber's computer).171 While any government effort to discrimi-
nate among news organizations raises important legal and public policy
questions,172 a solution that facilitates equal access to government infor-
mation should be workable. On the other hand, government agencies-
particularly law enforcement agencies-should not endeavor to direct
news organizations as to what they can and cannot do with government
information once they have obtained it.173
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO FAIRER GOVERNMENT
DISCLOSURE
With an aim toward reducing the role of selectively revealed politi-
cal intelligence in securities markets, we construct below several alterna-
tive approaches to formulating an FGD regime. Some of these ap-
proaches build upon existing rules and policies currently in place in the
federal government. Other possible approaches are more specifically tai-
lored to controlling the potential use of material nonpublic information
in securities trading.
Our objective here is not to set forth a persuasive case for any one
particular approach. Instead, we have chosen to highlight the potential
advantages and disadvantages of several distinct (and in some instances
competing) approaches. No single rule is likely to eradicate securities
trading on the basis of selectively disclosed political intelligence, and
170. See GAO POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY, supra note 32, at 20 (observing that "First
Amendment press protection" led some to conclude that any political intelligence registration and
reporting requirements must include an exemption for the media).
171. See Cushman, supra note 121 (discussing the DOL's kerfuffle with "Need to Know News," a
small enterprise owned by a German exchange whose "data goes directly from the [DOL] lock-ups to
specialized trading programs").
172. The government's ability to discriminate among news organizations raises complex questions
beyond the scope of this Article, though the answers may sometimes turn on the specific text of the
statutes or rules that regulate public disclosures by particular agencies. Agency lawyers should ex-
plore these issues perhaps in consultation with the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) before implementing a briefing room policy.
173. See infra notes 215 16 and accompanying text (discussing the New York Attorney General's
threatened enforcement action against Thompson-Reuters for its two-second advance notice of news
about the University of Michigan's consumer confidence data).
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even a combination of approaches will not eradicate all such trading.
Thus, most of these alternatives are under-inclusive in that they allow se-
lective disclosure of nonpublic government information to some persons
who might use it for trading in securities markets. Some farther-reaching
approaches to the problem could be costly and negatively impact gov-
ernment operations, unless agencies are given discretion to make excep-
tions.
We also worry that an FGD regime that relies on regulating private
sector conduct such as gathering "political intelligence" could deter citi-
zens from monitoring their government, which is essential in a democrat-
ic society.174 For this reason, our proposals focus on regulating the con-
duct of federal officials. Some of our proposals, however, would
encourage these officials to impose trading restrictions and confidentiali-
ty obligations on the private persons who receive government infor-
mation.
A. Designing an FGD Regime
1. The Executive Branch
As it did nearly fifty years ago with the FOIA, Congress could enact
an omnibus statute establishing a substantially broader disclosure
framework that instructs each agency in the executive branch to promul-
gate rules that implement the statute for their own employees. Although
agencies implementing this new FGD regime could be encouraged to
consult with the SEC, the agencies themselves should develop and
promulgate their own rules.
We recognize, of course, that in the absence of congressional action,
the President could implement an FGD regime for the executive branch
through an Executive Order. Our decision to frame these alternatives as
legislative efforts should not be taken to imply that an FGD regime for
federal agencies and departments cannot emanate from the executive
branch itself.
a. An Omnibus Statute with Full Disclosure as a Starting Point
One approach to the selective disclosure problem would be to start
with the transparency principle and assume that government should dis-
close as much information as possible. Thus, building on FOIA,175 Con-
gress could enact an omnibus statute that makes broad public dissemina-
tion-probably through websites-of agency information the norm
rather than the exception. One component of this full disclosure statute
174. See Nagy & Painter, supra note 21, at 1325 26 (remarking on constitutional concerns in-
volved in regulating political speech); id. at 1332 34 (describing problems associated with disclosure
regimes that regulate private speech).
175. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (emphasizing that information released under the
FOIA often remains nonpublic notwithstanding its release to the individual requestor).
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would require that when an agency responds to a FOIA request with dis-
closure of information, the agency would post the same information on
its website with an indication that it is being disclosed pursuant to a
FOIA request.
176
A second component of a full disclosure statute would require
agencies to post on their websites information provided to members of
Congress or to Congressional staff (For reasons explained below, regu-
lating selective disclosure by elected officials to their constitutes poses
special challenges, so agencies should at least be encouraged to publicly
disclose information shared with Congress.). Here, however, there
would have to be limited exceptions for circumstances where confidential
agency communications with Congress are more appropriate.
Yet another more ambitious component of a full disclosure statute
would attempt to reach a wider range of information by providing that,
unless an exception is justified, all executive branch agencies publicly
disclose all information about agency operations and agency decision-
making, including but not limited to information that would be material
to investors in publicly traded securities. Other countries, particularly
in Europe, are already moving in this direction.177  For example, the
Netherlands is already implementing mandatory disclosure of govern-
ment information in digital format. 17 A private organization has de-
signed a web application called Nulpunt that will aggregate documents
released by the Dutch government into an online database that allows
users to request documents on topics they are interested in.179 Private
groups in the United States have likewise been advocating statutory
176. Such a requirement would substantially expand § 552(2)(D) of the FOIA, which instructs
agencies to make available for inspection and copying all records that "have become or are likely to
become the subject of subsequent requests for substantially the same records." See supra note 48.
177. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, DIGITAL AGENDA FOR EUROPE: A EUROPE 20/20 INITIATIVE,
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/open-data-0 (last visited July18, 2014) (supporting "open data"
laws for several reasons, including because such laws foster "participation of citizens in political and
social life and increas[e] transparency of government").
178. See Roger Vleugels, Dutch Green Party Proposes Revised FOI Law, FREEDOMINFO.ORG
(Jun. 18, 2012), http://www.freedominfo.org/2012/06/dutch-green-party-proposes-revised-foi-law/ (de-
scribing changes to the Dutch Law on Transparency of Public Authorities (Dutch: "Wet Openbaar-
heid van Bestuur")).
179. A video created by Nulpunt points out:
A new Freedom of Information Act is in the making. This law enshrines public access to infor-
mation as a citizen's right, and impels public authorities to make government information widely,
and quickly, accessible in a digital format. It broadens the scope of the information to be made
accessible, to include all information held by public bodies or private bodies with a public man-
date or financed by taxpayers money. If government nevertheless wishes to keep information se-
cret, this exemption will have to be justified on a case by case basis. The new law will guarantee
that in the future all public documents produced by government will be automatically accessible,
and that these will be stored in a permanent electronic record. These are the first steps to what
we call the Leaking State [Dutch: "De Lekkende Overheid"].
Nulpunt, Democracy Without Secrets, VIMEO (June 6, 2012, 4:12 PM), http://vimeo.com/43562090; see
also id. ("Nulpunt is a web application that aggregates all documents produced by the Dutch govern-
ment and the public sector into an online database. Nulpunt asks users to register with the database
and subscribe to feeds on topics of government information that he or she is interested in. From that
moment on the user has access to all government documents relevant to the selected topics. Nulpunt
makes it possible for registered users to comment on and share elements from these documents
through third party social media and other channels.").
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changes that would make real-time public disclosure of market-moving
information more of a norm.80
There would, however, need to be exceptions to such a mandatory
continuous disclosure regime (Implementing digital disclosure would al-
so be more complicated and costly than in a smaller country such as the
Netherlands.). Exceptions would have to include classified information;
most information about ongoing agency investigations of particular per-
sons or entities as well as information concerning concluded investiga-
tions where no wrongdoing was discovered; information about agency
procurement decisions that needs to be kept confidential consistent with
federal procurement policy; information entrusted to an agency by pri-
vate persons or entities with an understanding that it remain confidential
(most such information is already exempted from disclosure under
FOIA); information about most agency personnel decisions; and certain
other categories of information for which a nondisclosure norm is appro-
priate. An agency probably would also need to have power to promul-
gate rules creating additional categories of exceptions to the mandatory
public disclosure rule, although a "sunset" provision could specify that
agency-created exceptions would only last for a limited time (for in-
stance, three years) unless they were renewed by the agency through the
same rulemaking process.
Finally, an omnibus full disclosure statute could provide that if an
agency has confidential information pursuant to one of the above excep-
tions, and that information for any reason is selectively disclosed to any-
one outside the government, the agency would be required to publicly
disclose the same information as soon as possible (the statute could, for
example, require disclosure on the agency website). Such a statutory de-
fault rule requiring public disclosure immediately following selective dis-
closure would need to have at least two exceptions.
First, selective disclosure of agency information to persons outside
the government will in some instances further legitimate agency objec-
tives (A similar accommodation of public companies' necessary private
communications with outsiders is embodied in Regulation FD.).8 1 The
statute could list broad categories of exceptions such as appropriate dis-
closures to government contractors, to persons being investigated by the
agency and to their lawyers, to persons considering employment with the
agency, to self-regulatory organizations ("SRO"), and to foreign gov-
ernments and subdivisions thereof. Agencies would then be empowered
to create additional "selective disclosure" categories by rulemaking. Se-
180. See, e.g., RIGHT TO KNOW CMTY., MOVING TOWARD A 21ST CENTURY RIGHT-TO-KNOW
AGENDA: RECOMMENDATIONS TO PRESIDENT-ELECT OBAMA AND CONGRESS 1 2 (2008), http://
www.foreffectivegov.org/files/21strtkrecs.pdf (advocating for "a government where ... federal agen-
cies proactively disseminate information to the public in timely, easy-to-find, and searchable formats"
and calling upon President Obama and Congress to "act decisively to achieve this vision"); see also
Part II.A.3 (discussing recent open-government initiatives in the Executive Branch).
181. See Nagy & Painter, supra note 21, at 1345 46.
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lective disclosures made pursuant to these exceptions would not require
immediate public disclosure of the same information.
Second, there will be some situations where even if there has been
inappropriate selective disclosure of agency information, there remains a
substantial government interest in keeping that information confidential
to the extent possible.182 In these situations, remedial measures other
than public disclosure of the information will be needed-for example,
recipients of the improperly disclosed information could be requested to
sign a confidentiality agreement and to promise not to use the infor-
mation for securities trading. In order to use this exception and deviate
from the presumed remedy of prompt public disclosure, the agency head
or general counsel should probably be required to document in writing
the reasons he or she believes public disclosure of information that has
already been selectively disclosed undermines a substantial government
interest as well as the alternative measures that have been implemented
to prevent use of the information in securities trading.
Yet another area where public disclosure could be required is the
time, place, and general topic of meetings between senior agency officials
and outside parties, except in circumstances where there is a specific
agency interest in keeping those meetings confidential."" The time and
place of meetings and the names of attendees -information often found
on senior agency officials' calendars-could be posted on agency web-
sites. Details about the content of those meetings might not be disclosed,
but the disclosure of the meeting itself (e.g., "Treasury Secretary meeting
with XYZ hedge fund") would provide some information about who sen-
ior agency officials are meeting with and why. Public disclosure of the
meeting itself-even without details about the meeting-would probably
also discourage inappropriate selective disclosure of nonpublic infor-
mation.
One difficulty with an approach that uses transparency as a starting
point, however, is that a lot of information that government agencies
learn should not be public, or at least should not be public right away.
Examples perhaps include the leanings of a FCC commissioner who has
not yet made up his mind about a proposed telecom merger, information
the DHS has about possible weaknesses in a particular airport screening
device, or information the DOJ has learned about the trading activities at
a major investment bank. In many of these instances, it might not be ap-
propriate to rely on mandatory public disclosure as a remedy for inap-
propriate selective disclosure. Exceptions to the mandatory disclosure
rule thus would become so numerous that the rule could become cum-
bersome to administer and largely irrelevant.
182. See, e.g., id. at 1354 (noting potentially legitimate reasons for maintaining confidentiality).
183. See id. at 1359 (observing that the Sunlight Foundation launched an "Operation Punch
Clock" campaign that encouraged members of Congress to post their official duty schedules on the
Internet).
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b. An Omnibus Statute with Confidentiality as a Starting Point
An effective FGD regime might have to use confidentiality rather
than disclosure as a starting point, and then require agencies to imple-
ment rules that prevent inappropriate selective disclosure of whatever
information is confidential. For example, an FGD regime could permit
disclosure of nonpublic government information only on a "need to
know" basis, unless the agency chooses to make public disclosure of the
same information. The rule could be modeled on the existing require-
ment that classified information only be disclosed to persons who have
the proper security clearance and a need to know.i"4 The selective disclo-
sure rule for nonclassified government information would not involve se-
curity clearance designations for individuals, but would require that re-
cipients of nonpublic government information have a demonstrable need
to know the information that is related to legitimate government func-
tions.
Again borrowing from the security clearance levels used to protect
classified information, nonpublic government information could be cate-
gorized based on the risk that it could be used to gain an unfair ad-
vantage in trading markets. Instead of the "confidential," "secret," and
"top secret" categories for classified information based on its importance
to national security, categories could use such terms as "market sensi-
tive" or "highly market sensitive." Agency staff would be required to
use their best efforts to determine whether nonpublic information in
their possession would be material (important) to investors in one or
more publicly traded securities and, if so, to designate the information as
"market sensitive," and whether the information would also likely have a
substantial effect on the market price of one or more publicly traded se-
curities and, if so, to designate the information as "highly market sensi-
tive" (A new regulation of offshore oil drilling might fall in the first cate-
gory and the likely failure of a large financial institution might fall in the
second category.). The "higher" the category level assigned to the in-
formation, the more precautions would be taken by the agency to pre-
vent its unauthorized selective disclosure prior to its public disclosure.
Selective disclosure of higher-category information would also require
documentation of the recipient's need to know as well as documentation
of a relationship of trust and confidence between the recipient of the in-
formation and the government.
The process for designating information as "market sensitive" or
"highly market sensitive" could also borrow from the process govern-
ment agencies use for classifying information for national security pur-
poses. Agency officials at an appropriate level of seniority (perhaps As-
sociate Directors or higher) would have authority to designate
184. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § I (defining classified information
as "any information or material that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant
to an Executive order, statute, or regulation, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for
reasons of national security").
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information as either "market sensitive" or "highly market sensitive."
Once conferred, such a designation would be removed only when the in-
formation is publicly disclosed or other subsequent developments cause
the information no longer to be market sensitive. Reversal of a determi-
nation that information is market sensitive (a process analogous to de-
classification of classified information) would require the approval of the
general counsel of the agency in which the designation was originally
made. Whereas classification of information for national security pur-
poses is overseen by an office of the National Archives,1 5 the process for
designating information as market sensitive would be administered solely
within the agency. The agency's general counsel's office could be en-
couraged to confer with the staff of the SEC when appropriate, but
would not be required to do so.
Once information is designated as "market sensitive" or "highly
market sensitive," the agency would be required to take appropriate
steps to protect it both from unauthorized selective disclosure and from
unauthorized use in securities trading after an authorized selective dis-
closure. More precautions would be taken with "highly market sensi-
tive" information than with "market sensitive" information, but both
categories of information would be given some protection. Steps at the
agency level to protect the nonpublic information could include the fol-
lowing:
1. Permit disclosure of the information outside the govern-
ment only after written documentation of the reason for the
disclosure outside the government (e.g., a memo or email to
an agency ethics officer explaining why the outside person
needs to know). The written documentation would list the
names of persons receiving the information and the steps
taken to prevent further dissemination or use of the infor-
mation for securities trading.
2. Provide a standard written warning to persons outside the
government who receive selectively disclosed government
information. The warning would state that unauthorized
disclosure of the information violates government regula-
tions and that use of the information for trading in securi-
ties markets could in some circumstances constitute securi-
ties fraud. Such a warning could be included in the bottom
of any email or other communication that contains nonpub-
lic government information (this approach -similar to that
used by many law firms to protect privileged communica-
tions-is easy and inexpensive because standard warning
language could be pasted into an email, letter or other doc-
ument). Information recipients who further disseminate the
information without authorization or who use it for securi-
ties trading would be barred from receiving selectively dis-
closed information in the future.
185. See Exec. Order No. 13,526,75 Fed. Reg. 708-09,720 (Dec. 9, 2009).
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3. Require that government contractors and certain other cat-
egories of outsiders sign a written confidentiality agreement
before being given access to nonpublic government infor-
mation. This agreement would expressly prohibit use of
confidential government information for securities trading
or disclosure of the information to persons who will use it
for securities trading. Unlike the written warning set out di-
rectly above, such an explicit nonuse agreement would like-
ly create a relationship of trust and confidence sufficient to
support an insider trading prosecution under the securities
laws.
18 6
4. Implement similar measures to protect information that the
U.S. government learns from foreign governments to pre-
vent it from being selectively disclosed and used for trading
in U.S. or foreign markets. This aspect of an FGD regime
would respond to the need for governments to share confi-
dential economic information that is material to investors
globally, and the risk that foreign governments will not trust
the U.S. government with nonpublic information (for ex-
ample, whether and how Argentina will make payments on
its debt) if the U.S. government does not take steps to pre-
vent use of that information in securities trading.
c. Prohibiting Selective Disclosure to Certain Categories of
Outsiders
A somewhat different approach-more closely modeled on SEC
Regulation FD itself-could focus on categories of outsiders that should
not receive nonpublic government information because of the risk that
they would use the information in securities trading or pass it along to
persons who use it in securities trading. 17 Hedge funds and other institu-
tional investors, securities analysts, political intelligence firms, invest-
ment advisers, and broker dealers are perhaps some of the more obvious
candidates for such a list. These initial categories of prohibited recipients
could be designated by statute, but adding to the list or creating excep-
tions would be done through agency rulemaking. The challenging task
for the individual agencies would be to designate categories of persons
and entities that might "use" or "tip" nonpublic government information
for securities trading without the number of persons and entities on such
a "prohibited" list being so great as to interfere with normal agency func-
tions. This determination could be made by individual agencies sepa-
rately, although the agencies might consult with the SEC in forming their
186. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997); supra notes 17-18 and accompanying
text (discussing Rule 10b5-2(b)(l) and (2)).
187. Regulation FD, for instance, prohibits certain corporate insiders from selectively disclosing
material nonpublic information to enumerated categories of outsiders including securities analysts,
broker-dealers, investment advisers, and holders of the corporation's securities who are likely to trade
on the basis of the information. 17 C.F.R § 243.100 (2013).
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lists of prohibited recipients of nonpublic information. An agency head
or general counsel could be authorized to remove the selective disclosure
prohibition from a specific person or entity in appropriate circumstances.
For example, the Treasury Department might have a good reason to dis-
close nonpublic information about its regulatory or enforcement position
to one or more financial services firms. An agency that makes such an
exception could be required to enter into a confidentiality and nonuse
agreement with the recipient of the selectively disclosed information.
One constitutional concern with listing prohibited recipients of se-
lective disclosure is that persons on the list will then be required to carry
out their business functions as well as their role as citizens (including po-
litical activity protected by the Constitution) at a disadvantage from per-
sons not on the list.88 They will not be able to learn information from the
government until that information has been publicly disseminated. Per-
sons and entities not on the list, in contrast, will be able to learn nonpub-
lic government information. Moreover, whenever persons on the list ex-
ercise their constitutional right to petition government officials for
redress of their grievances, government officials will likely be very cau-
tious about what is said to them and indeed may not agree to meet with
them at all, forcing such persons to indirectly make contact that other
persons can make directly. The difference in treatment between persons
and entities on the list and those not on the list may support a constitu-
tional argument that equal protection is being denied or that First
Amendment rights are unconstitutionally compromised.
Another practical problem is that persons and entities on the list
could use other persons and entities not on the list as conduits for acquir-
ing nonpublic information from government agencies. Think tanks, pub-
lic interest groups, academic researchers, journalists, and many other
persons not ordinarily associated with securities trading could be enlisted
by hedge funds, money managers, and other securities traders for this
purpose. This would not only circumvent the FGD regime but also un-
dermine important functions the conduit persons and organizations are
supposed to carry out when they acquire and disseminate information
about government (an academic or journalist who is moonlighting for a
hedge fund is probably not as likely to produce as high quality a product
in as timely a manner as one without this conflict of interest). In this
way, the approach of Regulation FD of barring selective disclosure to
certain categories of persons may be more suitable for public companies
that interact with noninvestor constituencies on a more limited and more
formal basis, than it is for government agencies that are expected to en-
gage in frequent exchange of information with a wide range of constitu-
encies as well as persons whose professional function is to research and
explain to the public the workings of government.
188. Cf Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair Disclosure
Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 47 60 (2005).
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d. Time and Place Restrictions
Another related-but perhaps less divisive -approach would be to
designate certain categories of meetings, conference calls, and events in
which nonpublic information is not to be discussed unless there is a con-
fidentiality and nonuse agreement or the same information is disclosed
publicly at the same time. Meetings with certain categories of persons or
entities could trigger this requirement (this relates to the "list" concept
discussed above, although instead of a flat prohibition on selective dis-
closure, a confidentiality/nonuse agreement would be an option). For
example, meetings with institutional investors (such as mutual fund,
hedge fund, or private equity firm managers) and trade associations
(such as the Securities Industry Association or the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association) or with securities analysts and political in-
telligence consultants might fall into the category of meetings that gov-
ernment officials only participate in if (1) it is agreed ahead of time that
no nonpublic government information is to be discussed, (2) a confiden-
tiality and nonuse agreement is entered into by all meeting participants,
or (3) the meeting will be streamed live on the agency website. Such a
rule could also impose stricter requirements on meetings that focus on
particular categories of subject matter most likely to be material to trad-
ers in securities markets, such as the award of a government contract, the
government's response to solvency issues in a financial institution, gov-
ernment enforcement action against a particular company, and agency
rulemaking or interpretive leanings that have not yet been made public.
Discussion of nonpublic government information at certain other
categories of meetings could simply be prohibited. For example, perhaps
only public information should be discussed at partisan political events
with agency employees in attendance. The Hatch Act already requires
that executive branch officials attend such events only in their personal
capacity,8 9 so it is difficult to justify discussion of nonpublic government
information at such events (the fact that participants are paying to attend
is particularly troubling). 190 Other categories of non-government spon-
sored social events -particularly events that people pay to attend-could
be added to the list of meetings in which nonpublic government infor-
mation is not to be discussed.
e. Violations
Regardless of which restrictions are imposed on selective disclosure,
or which combination of restrictions is imposed, an FGD regime will
have to address what is to be done if there is a violation. Public disclo-
sure by the agency of the same information that was selectively disclosed
is one remedial measure that could be required in appropriate circum-
stances. This disclosure should be made (perhaps on the agency website)
189. See 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (2012).
190. See Nagy & Painter, supra note 21, at 1359 n.390.
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as soon as possible after the agency learns of a departure from a re-
striction that is required under its FGD rules. If public disclosure is in-
consistent with important agency objectives (a determination that should
probably be made at least at the level of the agency's general counsel)
the agency should take whatever other steps are possible to prevent fur-
ther selective disclosure of the information as well as its use in securities
trading. Agency disciplinary action against federal officials who violate
the agency's policies may be warranted. A report by an agency to the
SEC of a suspected violation of agency FGD rules also might be an ap-
propriate way to put the SEC on notice about possible insider trading
law violations.1 91
f. Best Practice Protocols
Finally, Congress could opt for a lighter touch that would give con-
siderably more discretion to individual agencies rather than mandating
specific rules to address selective disclosure. Congress could, for in-
stance, instruct the executive branch agencies to develop their own "best
practices" on selective disclosure of nonpublic government information.
These best practices could be implemented through agency rulemaking,
personnel policy, or other means. For example, there could be a "best
practice" that agencies make information public as soon as practically
consistent with agency objectives (talking points posted on a webpage,
etc.). Some of the other measures described above might be implement-
ed as guidelines or rules by one or more agencies as part of their best
practices.
Some federal agencies are already responding to public criticism
with their own "best practices" for public disclosure of information. For
example, in late 2011 the Federal Reserve Board (the "Fed") faced criti-
cism in the Wall Street Journal for its private discussions of policy deci-
sions with economic analysts retained by wealthy individual and institu-
tional investors.192 In early 2012 the Fed announced a new policy for
public disclosure of federal funds rate forecasts by its policy committee
members. 193 Although the Fed has policy reasons to publicly disclose
such internal deliberations besides avoiding misuse of confidential in-
formation,1 9 4 the new disclosure policy reduces that risk as well. The dis-
191. See infra notes 209 10 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances under which a re-
ported FGD violation may warrant an SEC investigation).
192. Susan Pulliam, Investors Bullish on Fed Tips, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2011, http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204554204577025922155198762.
193. See Jon Hilsenrath & Luca Di Leo, Fed Will Detail Rate Plans, Easing Market Guesswork,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020346230457713885
0741089974 ("Under the plan, the Fed will publish a range of forecasts for interest rates among the
central bank's 17 individual policy makers including five board governors and 12 regional Fed bank
presidents.").
194. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STATEMENT ON LONGER-RUN GOALS
AND MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY (2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/
FOMCLongerRunGoals.pdf ("The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the
public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decisionmaking by households and
1562 [Vol. 2014
TRADING ON POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE
closure policy-embodied in the minutes of the Fed's December 2011
policy meeting rather than in a regulation-is the type of "best practice"
that could be implemented by other agencies seeking to enhance trans-
parency and avoid misuse of selectively disclosed information. Another
example of a "best practice" is the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's
decision to post on its website the surveys it sends to major financial
firms ahead of monetary policy meetings.19 5 Because those surveys con-
tain queries that "can provide early clues to the Fed's thinking," same-
day website accessibility creates a more level playing field for ordinary
investors who previously lacked access to these surveys.196
Prior to the SEC's adoption of Regulation FD in 2000, a similar
"best practices" approach was suggested as a preferable alternative for
the private sector.197 The SEC rejected this approach because it believed
that an outright prohibition of selective disclosure was necessary for pub-
licly traded companies.198 There may, however, be more to favor this ap-
proach in the context of government disclosure because, as public serv-
ants, federal officials are already obliged to factor the public interest into
their decision-making. Best practices could stand alone or perhaps be
combined with a few specific statutory rules such as a prohibition on dis-
cussing nonpublic government information at political fundraisers.
2. The Legislative Branch
Many of these approaches to selective disclosure of nonpublic mar-
ket-moving information in the executive branch could be used to address
the leaking of political intelligence in the legislative branch. There are,
however, important differences.
First, there are 435 Representatives (plus six nonvoting members)
and one hundred Senators in the legislative branch, compared with only
two elected officials, the President and Vice President, in the executive
branch. Representatives and Senators are expected to meet with con-
stituents frequently and are often asked their views on important legisla-
tion, including indications of how they will vote. Imposing a "need to
know" requirement in this context could be unduly burdensome. And
businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy,
and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society.").
195. Susan Pulliam, NY Fed Opens up Its Discussions with Banks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204397704577074703634129484.
196. Id.
197. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 7,881, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 86,319 (Aug. 15, 2000) (pointing out that some commenters recommended "that the
Commission not adopt any mandatory rule prohibiting selective disclosure, like Regulation FD, but
instead pursue voluntary means of addressing the problem, such as ... the promotion of a 'blue rib-
bon' panel to develop best practices for issuer disclosure").
198. See id. ("Regulation FD is also designed to address another threat to the integrity of our
markets: the potential for corporate management to treat material information as a commodity to be
used to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or investors. As noted in the Proposing Re-
lease, in the absence of a prohibition on selective disclosure, analysts may feel pressured to report fa-
vorably about a company or otherwise slant their analysis in order to have continued access to selec-
tively disclosed information.").
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written confidentiality and nonuse agreements could further impede con-
stituent communication. Cordoning off broad categories of persons or
entities from communication with their elected representatives would al-
so be politically and perhaps constitutionally unacceptable (Senators and
Representatives from New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, for
example, frequently communicate with persons affiliated with hedge
fund, private equity, and mutual fund firms).199
For the legislative branch, perhaps even more than the executive
branch, the starting point should be public disclosure of as much infor-
mation as possible. House and Senate rules should probably encour-
age-but not require-members to disclose on their websites their views
on pending legislation. The websites could always include a caveat that
the member's views may change as they continue to discuss the legisla-
tion with their constituents. Members who are asked in private conversa-
tions about the views or potential votes of other members also could be
encouraged to refer the inquirer to the other members' websites, alt-
hough communication about impressions of the views of other members
should not be prohibited. Calendars of members and their staff could al-
so be posted on members' websites so the public can see with whom they
are meeting.2 0 While these disclosures would not necessarily include the
substance of the meetings, the disclosure of the meetings would probably
make it less likely that nonpublic information would be disclosed and
then used for securities trading. These and other "full disclosure" guide-
lines could be articulated in the House and Senate rules as "best practic-
es," departure from which could displease voters and lead to criticism in
the press but would not result in an ethics investigation or sanction of the
member.
Besides a "full disclosure" principle, House and Senate rules or best
practices could preclude members and their staff from discussing any
nonpublic government information at political fundraisers, and perhaps
also in meetings attended by persons known to the member or staff per-
son to be seeking nonpublic information at the meeting for purposes of
securities trading. Because of the "knowledge" requirement, disciplinary
action would not be likely under these rules (Indeed, the rules could be
phrased as a "best practice" which would preclude disciplinary action al-
together.). If, however, a member or staff person discussed nonpublic
government information with someone who later used it for securities
trading, the rule or best practice provision could be grounds for strong
public criticism, and could become fodder for an opposing political cam-
paign. The member might be compelled to explain publicly why he or his
staff member did not know that the meeting participant was seeking in-
formation for securities trading. Such a broad standard -although diffi-
199. See Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 24.
200. See Nagy & Painter, supra note 21, at 1359 (discussing the Sunlight Foundation's "Operation
Punch Clock" campaign).
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cult to enforce as a rule in a formal proceeding-thus might be a suffi-
cient deterrent in a legislative branch that is sensitive to public opinion.
Yet another approach would be for members to post on their
webpage a notice explaining that the member or a member of her staff
may from time to time discuss nonpublic government information with
constituents who have relevant questions or concerns. The message
would go on to say that
in such circumstances, I or a member of my staff will share nonpub-
lic information with a constituent so the constituent might better
participate in the deliberative process. The constituent in turn is
expected not to use the nonpublic information for purposes of secu-
rities trading and not to disclose the information to someone else
who will use it in securities trading.
If a member or staff member communicates nonpublic information to a
constituent in writing, for example in an email, the rule or "best practice"
could provide that a similar statement should be included at the end of
the written communication. This statement alone would probably not be
sufficient to establish a legal relationship of trust and confidence creating
liability under insider trading laws,2 1 but it would probably discourage
misuse of the information in many instances.
Although trading by members of Congress themselves is not the
subject of this Article, members have access to much selectively disclosed
nonpublic information from executive branch agencies. Public confi-
dence is eroded-and actual insider trading law violations may occur-
when members of Congress and their staff make changes in their own in-
vestment portfolios after they have received such nonpublic infor-
mation.2"
Congress could adopt any one of a number of measures to guard
against the use of material nonpublic information as well as to counter
the public perception that legislative judgments are sometimes influ-
enced by their likely effect on the personal investment portfolios held by
members. For starters, Congress could pass legislation, or adopt a rule
or best practice, that members and their senior staff put their assets in a
blind trust and/or only make changes to their portfolios at certain times
of year, perhaps during Congressional recesses when they are less likely
to have access to selectively disclosed information. Such "trading win-
dows" have been used by publicly traded companies to avoid insider
trading allegations against their executives, and Congress could consider
201. See supra notes 15 19 and accompanying text (explaining when a legal relationship of trust
and confidence is formed).
202. See Kimberly Kindy et al., Lawmakers Reworked Financial Portfolios After Talks with Fed,
Treasury Officials, WASH. POST, June 24, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lawmakers-
reworked-financial-portfolios-after-talks-with-fed-treasury-
officials/2012/06/24/gJQAnQPg0V story.html (reporting that thirty-four members of Congress made
changes to their investment portfolios, mostly switching to safer investments, after private meetings
with Treasury Department and Federal Reserve officials in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis).
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adhering to a similar regime.2 3 Another approach, recently proposed in
an article by one of us, would prohibit members from holding equity or
debt securities in companies substantially affected by the work of any
congressional committee on which they hold membership. 4 Congress
could also explore the adoption of an even stricter anticonflict measure,
such as a statute or rule that would, subject to some narrow exceptions,
prohibit members from owning any securities other than those in widely
held investment funds that are not sector specific. 05
3. The Judicial Branch
Selective disclosure by judicial branch officials is not the principal
focus of this Article, and given the strict confidentiality norms observed
by judges and their law clerks, selective disclosure is not as likely to be a
problem in the judicial branch as it is in the other two branches of gov-
ernment. Leaks do occur, usually from law clerks, but most leaks occur
after judicial decisions are publicly announced (For example, there were
leaks of information in 2012 about how Chief Justice Roberts made up
his mind to uphold the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, of-
ten referred to as "Obamacare, ' 20 6 but there were no reported leaks be-
fore the decision was announced.). Such information about why judges
decided what they already decided should not be disclosed by law
clerks,207 but it is much less likely to be used for securities trading than
information about what judges are going to decide in the future.
Ex parte communications rules also severely limit communications
about cases with judicial officers outside of formal hearings, reducing the
opportunity for selective disclosure. Congress and administrative agen-
cies, by contrast, regularly engage in ex parte communications with regu-
lated industries and other constituents.
Nonetheless, an FGD regime could encompass an effort by the fed-
eral courts to protect nonpublic information about judicial decisions
from being used in securities markets. For example, procedures for the
announcement of important judicial decisions could be reviewed and re-
fined. Although the development of new rules would best be left to the
203. See RALPH C. FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY, & HERBERT THOMAS, FERRARA ON INSIDER
TRADING AND THE WALL § 7.02[d] (2013) (discussing preestablished "safe" trading periods during
which directors, officers, employees, and other agents of publicly traded companies are generally
permitted to trade in their company's securities).
204. See Nagy, supra note 167, at 570 & n.11 (2013) (referencing President Obama's call in his
2012 State of the Union Address for new legislation that would prohibit "any elected official from
owning stocks in industries they impact").
205. Id. at 62(-23 (discussing a proposal that would have required Members of Congress to sell
any stocks that create conflicts or hold such investments only in blind trusts).
206. See Sam Baker, Supreme Court Healthcare Ruling Leaks Have DC Buzzing: Who is the Cul-
prit?, THE HILL (July 4, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/legal-challenges/236197-
supreme-court-talk-has-dc-buzzing-who-is-the-leaker.
207. See Richard W. Painter, Open Chambers?, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1471 (1999) (reviewing
EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE Epic
STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998) and discussing the associated breach of confidentiali-
ty rules).
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Judicial Conference of the United States, Congress could consider re-
quiring federal courts to implement new provisions in codes of ethics, or
to adopt other measures, that would explicitly address the risks of selec-
tive disclosure.
B. Implementing and Enforcing an FGD Regime
A plan for implementing an FGD regime would need to respect
constitutional concerns as well as the broader political economy. Thus,
at this point in time, mandates could be brief and could allow considera-
ble flexibility.
For example, focusing first on the executive branch, Congress could
enact a statute to read: "Each executive branch agency shall within 180
days of enactment of this title, promulgate its own rules designed to pre-
vent disclosure of material nonpublic government information to persons
who will use such information for trading in securities markets." If Con-
gress were to choose the "best practices" approach, or allow it as an op-
tion, the phrase "best practices" would be inserted in place of or in addi-
tion to the word "rules" in the statute. The House-Senate report or
other legislative history accompanying this bill could describe specific
approaches that the agencies might consider for implementing the statu-
tory mandate, including the possible approaches described in this article.
The statute could also instruct the SEC to study the effectiveness of these
agency rules after they are implemented and submit a report to Con-
gress, although such a report should not be due until the SEC has had
time to examine how the agency rules work in practice.
Alternatively, in the absence of congressional action, the President
could implement an FGD regime for the executive branch through an
Executive Order.
Implementing an FGD regime for congressional officials and em-
ployees rests with Congress alone. Congress could, for example, make a
statutory promise to enact its own rules, while reserving the flexibility it
needs to design rules consistent with the obligation elected officials have
to communicate freely with their constituents. The statute thus could
provide, "the House and the Senate shall each within 180 days of enact-
ment of this title, promulgate its own rules designed to prevent disclosure
of material nonpublic government information to persons who are likely
to use such information for trading in securities markets."
Enforcement of the FGD regime -for both the executive and legis-
lative branches -could, at least in many instances, involve the SEC at the
initial stage of an investigation. For instance, where the SEC's regular
surveillance of trading in securities markets reveals the possible selective
disclosure of material nonpublic government information, the SEC could
begin an investigation and could notify the relevant agency or congres-
sional committee. Indeed, the SEC's regular surveillance of market ac-
tivity has uncovered selective disclosure on several instances in the past,
such as in 2005, when there were noticeable spikes in trading volume and
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stock prices for several companies with substantial exposure to asbestos
lawsuits.0 8 These spikes occurred two days before a speech by Senate
Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) that announced his support for leg-
islation that would have created a $140 billion trust fund for asbestos lia-
bility claims.0 9 The SEC could then work with the agency or congres-
sional committee to determine whether there were any actual violations
of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. That is, the SEC
could investigate the persons who allegedly disclosed the government in-
formation, the likely recipients of the selectively disclosed information,
and the persons who may have traded on the basis of the information,
and could institute enforcement actions where facts demonstrate fraudu-
lent tipping or trading. For instance, if the SEC could show a federal of-
ficial's pecuniary gain in return for the selective disclosure of nonpublic
government information used for trading, the SEC would have the evi-
dence necessary to satisfy the personal benefit test for tipper/tippee lia-
210bility. Moreover, in some instances, confidentiality warnings and non-
use agreements required by the FGD regime could define the
relationship of trust and confidence necessary to establish that persons
outside the government misappropriated the selectively disclosed infor-
mation that had been entrusted to them by a federal official.21  The SEC
already is empowered to enforce existing antifraud laws, and thus the
FGD regime could have some bite.
When, however, an SEC investigation fails to reveal facts indicating
the receipt by a federal official of an improper personal benefit, or a mis-
appropriation of government information, the SEC's role should cease.
Violations of selective disclosure rules that fall short of illegal insider
tipping and trading should not be remedied by the SEC. Instead, when
an agency official has violated an FGD rule, disciplinary action should be
taken by the agency employing that official. When a Member or em-
ployee has violated an FGD rule, the House or Senate ethics committees,
or some other congressionally-delegated body, should be charged with
disciplinary authority.
FGD violations may also be discovered separately from the SEC's
market surveillance activities. For example, a supervisor may have rea-
son to believe that a subordinate has withheld information required to be
made public, or released information required to remain confidential. In
208. Nagy & Painter, supra note 21, at 1301 02.
209. See Brody Mullins & Kara Scannell, Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists to Gather Tips in
Washington, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB116554698892944296
(reporting that the SEC "is looking into whether laws are being broken somewhere in the transfer of
information between Congress and Wall Street").
210. See supra notes 14, 117 (referencing criminal prosecutions involving an FBI agent tipping
confidential law enforcement database information and a USDA employee tipping cotton crop statis-
tics).
211. See SEC v. Davis, Litigation Release No. 18,322, 81 SEC Docket 2952 (Sept. 4, 2003) (an-
nouncing SEC settlement of securities fraud charges involving a political consultant who tipped mate-
rial nonpublic T-Bill information to bond traders at Goldman Sachs notwithstanding his agreement
with the Treasury Department to retain the confidentiality of the information until a press embargo
was lifted).
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such instances, the agency or a congressional committee may wish to in-
vestigate possible violations of the FGD regime by the agency or con-
gressional official. Requiring a report to the SEC of a violation of agen-
cy or congressional FGD rules, however, might be a good approach, as
the report would give the SEC an opportunity to begin an insider trading
investigation in appropriate cases.
Because of constitutional and policy concerns, we do not propose
federal legislation that would affect the operations of state or local gov-
ernments, although the ideas discussed in this Article, and any federal
legislation that is enacted, could provide a useful model for states and lo-
calities.
C. The Government's Sale of its Market-Moving Information
Given the market value of certain types of nonpublic government
information, as well as severe budget shortfalls at the federal and state
levels, it may be tempting for government agencies to explore the possi-
bility of selling "early release" of market-moving information to inves-
tors who are willing to pay for it. Could the Department of Defense, for
example, recoup a portion of the cost of a new Air Force fighter plane
contract by selling to hedge funds early release of the identity of the con-
tractor awarded the contract? Could the DOJ sell early release of the
identity of companies it was going to indict? Following this approach to
its logical conclusion, government agencies could cut out the "middle
man" and convey information directly to a trading floor set up in the
Department of the Treasury, which would then plow trading profits back
into agency budgets.
While these examples may seem outrageous, the possibility of a
federal or state agency selling access to its own market-moving infor-
mation is hardly a mere hypothetical. The University of Michigan is a
richly endowed subdivision of the financially strapped State of Michigan,
and the University has generated more than a million dollars annually by
selling the exclusive publication rights to its consumer confidence survey
data to Thomson-Reuters. 212 Thomson-Reuters, in turn, collected steep
premiums from hedge funds and other institutional investors that were
willing to pay for an exclusive two second advanced feed to that infor-
mation (designed specifically for algorithmic trading) ahead of other
Thomson-Reuters subscribers. 213 The University must have known that
Thompson-Reuters sold such advanced feed release and that the revenue
generated from that selective disclosure constituted a large part of
Thomson-Reuters's interest in the data. The fact that this arrangement
might make national and global securities markets less fair, and perhaps
212. Brody Mullins et al., Traders Pay for an Early Peek at Key Data, WALL ST. J, June 12, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324682204578515963191421602.
213. Id.
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214less attractive, to other investors, was apparently not of great concern.
The New York Attorney General, however, was greatly concerned and
threatened to seek a court order under the Martin Act, an antifraud pro-
vision much broader in scope than Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the
Exchange Act.215 Although Thomson-Reuters took the position that its
tiered release of the information was fully disclosed to all subscribers
(and therefore not fraudulent), the company "capitulated and agreed to
temporarily suspend the practice for the duration of the investigation.,
216
Despite the temptation for government agencies to make money in
this way, there are substantial downsides. Government agencies might
become less open to the public in general, hoping to sell information first
to investors willing to pay. Timing of public announcements by govern-
ment officials might be driven by market considerations -e.g., when in-
formation is mostly likely to move markets and maximize trading prof-
its-rather than the public interest. Rather than make a series of less
significant announcements, an agency might hold back related infor-
mation until it could all be released at the same time, and have greater
market impact. Furthermore, there can be an enormous incentive for
government agencies (including state universities engaged in research) to
exaggerate the importance or magnitude of information, in order to max-
imize the trading profits of those willing to pay for the early release of
that information. In sum, arrangements where investors pay govern-
ment agencies for market-moving information could have long-term neg-
ative impact on effectiveness and credibility of government that far out-
weigh any short-term gain in accounts receivable. This negative impact is
in addition to the effect of selective disclosure on securities trading mar-
kets if investors move their money elsewhere because they believe the
game is stacked against them unless they pay the government for prefer-
ential access to information.
V. CONCLUSION
The selective disclosure of market moving information by federal
officials undermines the integrity of government by adding to the already
long list of situations in which well-connected persons have advantages
over ordinary citizens. Selective disclosure by government insiders, like
the selective disclosure by corporate executives that preceded Regulation
FD, also widens informational disparities among securities traders. Or-
dinary investors are likely to question their ability to make good invest-
214. The University of Michigan has a substantial endowment, a portion of which is invested in
securities markets. Using similar logic, the University might be tempted to consider early release of
the information to managers of this endowment so they too could profit from it.
215. See Peter Lattman, Thomson Reuters to Suspend Early Peeks at Key Index, N.Y. TIMES, July
7, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/thomson-reuters-to-suspend-early-peeks-at-key-
index/.
216. Id.
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ment decisions if well-connected investors possess the privilege of an in-
side government track.
In the absence of personal gain by a federal official (or other facts
indicating that government information has been misappropriated) nei-
ther the selective disclosure of material nonpublic government infor-
mation nor the securities trading on such information is generally illegal
under the federal securities laws. But a solution lies within the govern-
ment itself, and more specifically within the individual governmental
units from which political intelligence originates. To foster fairer gov-
ernment disclosure, each branch, agency, and other component of gov-
ernment must act to design its own policies and procedures consistent
with its other objectives and the objectives of government as a whole.
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